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Note
Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co.: Just in Case
You Had Any Doubts - There Is No Tort
of Negligent Misrepresentation in New
York
"[S]ticks and stones can break my bones, but words will never
hurt me. "1
"We are now asked to say that a like liability attaches to the
circulation of a thought or a release of the explosive power resi-
dent in words."2
I. Introduction
The old stereotype of an accountant? You know it. That
five-foot-two, physically unfit individual, bespectacled, at all
times wielding a trusty calculator and clad in that stylish pocket
protector. Geeky? Yes. Boring? Perhaps. Combative? Absolutely
not. Well, it may be time for that old stereotype to die.
It is no secret that the most recent recession3 crippled many
enterprises and forced them to seek the protection of bank-
ruptcy.4 Creditors, investors, and shareholders alike, reeling
1. Quoted in Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105,
1106 (1979).
2. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 181, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
3. Despite the United States economy's continued anemic performance, the dating
committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research, an official panel of economists
that charts business cycles, has reported that the recession, which began in July 1990,
officially ended in March 1991. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., This Just In: Recession Ended
21 Months Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at D1.
4. The total number of bankruptcies filed under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(including those filed under chapters 7, 9, 11 and 12) totalled 360,329 and 367,866 in
1
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from behemoth losses have, in droves, turned to the auditors 5 of
these fallen enterprises seeking recompense. The response of
the accountants? A far cry from the conventional stereotype.
The accounting profession has engaged in the battle and is fight-
ing tooth and nail to reform the current liability structure of this
country.7
The primary nemesis of the profession is joint and several
liability, a liability system that renders an accountant liable for
a plaintiff's damages,8 in toto, regardless of the degree to which
1981 and 1982 respectively. In 1989, this number had skyrocketed to 642,993. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 538
(111th ed. 1991) (Table No. 884).
5. The terms "auditor" and "accountant" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note. Because the courts use the term "accountant" when discussing the cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation, i.e., accountants' liability for negligent misrepre-
sentation, this Note will predominantly use this term. It should be noted, however, that
these terms do have distinct meanings. An accountant is a person engaged in audit, tax
or management advisory services. Auditors constitute a subset of accountants; their role
is to examine financial statements in order to determine whether they are presented
fairly, and in accordance with established accounting standards. See Willis W. Hagen II,
Accountants' Common Law Negligence Liability to Third Parties, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 181, 181-82 n.4.
6. On August 31, 1992, the six largest accounting firms in the country, Arthur An-
dersen & Company, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG
Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse (known collectively as the "Big Six"), issued a
position paper estimating that the accounting profession as a whole currently faces
claims totaling approximately $30 billion. THE LIABILITY CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES:
IMPACT ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, reprinted in J. ACCT., Nov. 1992, at 19, 19 [here-
inafter THE LIABILITY CRISIS]. In 1991, the Big Six expended $477 million on litigation,
amounting to nine percent of their domestic auditing and accounting revenues. Id. at 20.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the governing body of
the accounting profession, has reported that claims asserted against firms other than the
Big Six rose by two-thirds from 1987 to 1991. AICPA BOARD ENDORSEMENT, reprinted in
J. ACCT., Nov. 1992, at 18, 18. Approximately 25 years ago, one commentator noted that,
"[s]uits against accountants by persons other than their clients have been almost uni-
formly unsuccessful." Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial
Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (1967). Times have certainly changed.
7. In an unprecedented step, the ordinarily fiercely competitive Big Six have joined
forces in this call for litigation reform. See THE LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 6, at 23. In
an effort to impact impending federal legislation, the AICPA's political action commit-
tee, the Effective Legislation Committee (ELC), has stepped-up efforts to lobby the U.S.
Congress. William Sternberg, Cooked Books, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 20,
35. Contributions by the ELC have increased from $20,300 in the 1981-82 election cycle
to $912,159 in 1987-88 cycle. Id. In addition, the ELC gave $1,087,044 during 1989-90 to
important members of Congress sitting on key banking, tax, and commerce committees.
Id.
8. THE LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 6, at 19.
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that accountant's culpability contributed to those damages.9 The
profession strenuously argues that:
In practical terms this means that, even with no evidence of cul-
pability, a company's independent auditors are almost certain to
be named in any action filed against that company alleging finan-
cial fraud for no reason other than the auditors' perceived deep
pockets or because they are the only potential defendant that is
still solvent."0
The result of this, the profession contends, is that numerous ac-
countants are forced to settle even the most baseless of claims.1
To remedy this inequity, the accounting profession has ar-
gued that joint and several liability should be discarded on both
the state and federal levels.'" In its place, the profession has ar-
gued for the adoption of a "proportionate liability system,""3
9. Where multiple wrongdoers act either concurrently or successively to cause a sin-
gle, indivisible injury, comparative negligence statutes allow a jury to allocate the per-
centage of fault that each joint tortfeasor has contributed to a victim's damages. Mike
Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 23
TORT INS. L.J. 482, 482 (1988). Joint and several liability, however, allows that victim to
recover all of his damages from any one of the tortfeasors, regardless of the fact that the
tortfeasor held entirely liable may only have minimally contributed to causing those
damages. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at
475 (5th ed. 1984). Although the tortfeasor who pays more than his allocated share may
generally seek contribution from another tortfeasor, it is not unusual that the deficient
tortfeasor is unable to satisfy his proportionate share of the judgment. See id. at 476-77.
The policy justifications advanced for joint and several liability are that of compen-
sation and deterrence. Nancy L. Manzer, Comment, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A
Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Lia-
bility, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 644, 648 (1988). The compensation argument is that the
joint tortfeasor, who is after all a wrongdoer, should bear the risk of a co-tortfeasor's
insolvency, not the innocent victim. Id. at 644. The deterrence justification is that the
prospect of complete liability provides an added disincentive for the would-be joint
tortfeasor. Id. at 648. In the late 1980s, as a part of the tort reform effort, several states
either modified or completely discarded joint and several liability. Id. at 628, 636. Many
state legislatures concluded that the comparative negligence rule in conjunction with the
joint and several liability rule was inequitable to many defendants. Id. at 636.
10. THE LIABmITY CRISIS, supra note 6, at 19.
11. Id. at 20. THE LIABILITY CRISIS position paper points-to several factors that coa-
lesce to make a coerced settlement inevitable: the prospect of being held accountable for
all the plaintiffs damages even though the accountant is only minimally responsible; the
fact that very often a settlement is cheaper than the legal fees connected with fighting
the claim; and finally, the inability of the accountant to obtain recompense for the legal
fees incurred as a result of fighting a baseless claim. Id.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Id. Proportionate liability is a synonym for several liability. See KEETON, supra
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
which would limit an accountant's liability to the portion of
damages that the fact-finder determines the accountant has
caused." *This system, the profession asserts, "would help re-
store balance and equity to the liability system by discouraging
specious suits and giving blameless defendants the incentive to
prove their cases in court rather than settle. '1 5
Critics of this effort contend that the litigation against ac-
countants is, by and large, a justified product of substandard au-
dits.'" These antagonists point out that over two-thirds of the
current litigation against accountants is a product of the savings
and loan ("S&L") debacle.' 7 They also point to the studies of
the causes of the S&L debacle showing that, in several cases,
accountants "sacrificed traditional values of the accounting pro-
fession- conservatism, skepticism, objectivity, and indepen-
dence - and either 'looked the other way' in order to retain
S&L auditing business, or deliberately participated in and bene-
fited from the pillaging of S&L's.' '18
Last summer, in the midst of this controversy, the New
York Court of Appeals issued its latest decision regarding the
scope of accountants' liability' 9 to third parties for negligent
note 9, § 67, at 475.
14. THE LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 6, at 23.
15. Id.
16. See sources cited infra notes 17-18.
17. Thomas McCarroll, Who's Counting?, TIME, Apr. 13, 1992, at 48. From 1980 to
1988, over 500 S&L associations failed throughout the United States, more than three
times the number of those that had failed in the previous 45 years combined. S. REP. No.
19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
18. Jan S. Blaising, Note, Are the Accountants Accountable? Auditor Liability in
the Savings and Loan Crisis, 25 IND. L. REV. 475, 511 (1991). In California, 28 of the 30
S&L institutions involved in this scandal received a clean audit opinion the year before
they became insolvent. Sternberg, supra note 7, at 20. Furthermore, a Government Ac-
counting Office study of 11 Texas S&L failures found that in six cases the audits were
conducted in "an inadequate or unprofessional manner." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. AFMD-89-45, CPA AUDIT QUALITY: FAILURES OF CPA AUDITS TO IDENTIFY AND
REPORT SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS AND LOAN PROBLEMS 2 (1989). As a result, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, as well as the Resolution Trust Corporation, have initiated
a spate of litigation against the auditors of failed S&L's. See Samuel J. Winer & Ken-
neth B. Winer, Accountants' Liability for Audits of Savings & Loan Associations, 646
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 157, 159 (1991).
19. This Note deals primarily with the claim of negligent misrepresentation asserted
against accountants. It should be pointed out, however, that the principles articulated in
this context have import beyond this profession. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E.2d 318, 590
[Vol. 13:763
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misrepresentation 0 in Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v.
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1992) (negligent misrepresentation asserted against attorneys); Ossining
Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 539 N.E.2d 91, 541
N.Y.S.2d 335 (1989) (negligent misrepresentation asserted against architects and con-
sulting engineers); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 11, 526
N.E.2d 8, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1988) (negligent misrepresentation asserted against financial
advisors); Board of Managers of Astor Terrace Condominium v. Schuman, Lichtenstein,
Claman & Efron, 183 A.D.2d 488, 583 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1st Dep't 1992) (negligent misrepre-
sentation asserted against engineering and design professionals); Kidd v. Havens, 171
A.D.2d 336, 577 N.Y.S.2d 989 (4th Dep't 1991) (negligent misrepresentation asserted
against title company); Belgo Asian Diamond Cy. v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co.,
168 A.D.2d 345, 562 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dep't 1990) (negligent misrepresentation asserted
against bank).
20. According to the Second Restatement of Torts, negligent misrepresentation oc-
curs when:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuni-
ary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). This core definition is useful for intro-
ductory purposes; however, the Restatement provisions as to the scope of liability to
nonprivies for negligent misrepresentation is one of three basic methodologies currently
used. See discussion infra sections C and D of part II.
Negligent misrepresentation is a state common law action; so too is its sibling,
fraudulent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931) (discussing both causes of action). Section 526 of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts provides that a misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker: "(a) knows
or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confi-
dence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he
does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). In contrast to the disparity prevalent among jurisdic-
tions with negligent misrepresentation, see infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text,
there is general consensus across the country that a nonprivy party may successfully
assert a cause of action against the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation.
In addition, accountants may be subject to liability under various federal securities
laws as a result of material misstatements in the financial statements they have audited.
Under the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11(a), 48 Stat. 74, 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1988), an accountant can be held liable to those who rely on a materially mis-
leading audit report contained in a registered offering or prospectus. Id. Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in combination with Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's regulations, exposes auditors of publicly held companies to
liability to a third party, if that party can show scienter or intent to defraud. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). In certain circumstances, an auditor may also be
exposed to criminal liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). See generally Richard P. Swanson, Theories of Liability,
708 A.L.I.-AB.A. COURSE OF STUDY 1 (1992) (discussing securities law claims against
5
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Peat Marwick Main & Co."' On this occasion, the court was
faced with the question of whether the creditor of a bankrupt
retailer, which relied on the retailer's materially misleading fi-
nancial statements, could sustain a cause of action against the
retailer's public accountant for allegedly negligently auditing
those statements.22
In reinstating the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of the accounting firm, the court concluded that the elements
established in an earlier New York Court of Appeals' decision,
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,25 had not been
satisfied .2  The elements of Credit Alliance, if met, purport to
demonstrate that the relationship between the third-party plain-
tiff and a defendant-accountant is tenable enough to support lia-
bility; a relationship that the Court of Appeals had previously
defined as one "sufficiently approaching privity. ''1 5 The role of
the New York Court of Appeals in this area of the law,2" and of
accountants).
21. 79 N.Y.2d 695, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 586 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1992). See discussion infra
part III.
22. Id. at 698, 597 N.E.2d at 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
23. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985). See infra notes 133-53
and accompanying text.
24. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 699, 597 N.E.2d at 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
25. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
"Privity" in this context refers to privity of contract; the concept that those not a party
to a contract have no right to sue for a breach of it. See infra note 64. Historically,
privity was applied strictly; thus, unless a plaintiff could show that he was a party to a
contract that caused him injury, he could not sue for negligence. See Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). The relationship "sufficiently approaching
privity" represents a juridical retreat from this strict interpretation. See infra note 64. It
is a recognition that there are third parties, not signatories to a contract, to whom the
promisee may owe a duty. See Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 444.
26. The New York Court of Appeals was one of the first courts to loosen the stric-
tures of the privity doctrine, see infra note 64, and promulgated ground-breaking opin-
ions in this area of the law. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275
(1922) (see infra note 64 for further discussion); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (allowing a personal injury suit against the manufacturer
of defective chattel despite the plaintiffs lack of privity with the manufacturer); Law-
rence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) (see infra note 64 for further discussion). The privity
doctrine has had a pervasive impact on the scope of accountants' liability for negligent
misrepresentation; thus, the Court of Appeals had a significant impact on this cause of
action before it even evolved. See infra note 64.
In addition, in Ultramares, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge
Cardozo, undertook the first significant analysis of an accountant's liability to a non-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/14
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New York itself as the recognized commercial capital of this na-
tion,27  truly makes Security Pacific a case of seminal
importance.
Part II of this Note will begin with a discussion of the ac-
countant's role in the business community. In order to fully as-
sess the negligent misrepresentation cause of action as it applies
to accountants, it is essential to understand the accountant's
role as it is perceived by the accounting profession itself, others
in the business community, and the courts. Part II also discusses
the nature of an audit, the performance that typically spawns
the negligent misrepresentation claim against an accountant. An
understanding of the audit function is also imperative in adjudg-
ing the negligent misrepresentation cause of action as it applies
to accountants.
Part II will continue with an analysis of the negligent mis-
representation cause of action. This analysis will be conducted
with a focus on New York law. Preliminarily, the case law lead-
ing up to Security Pacific will be surveyed. The contract princi-
ples that were applied to negligent misrepresentation as it first
evolved will be reviewed. The tort principles that have more re-
cently been applied to negligent misrepresentation will also be
analyzed. Finally, Part II will conclude with a consideration of
whether a tort of negligent misrepresentation was developing in
New York. If this was so, Security Pacific has conclusively abro-
client for negligent misrepresentation. See Albert G. Besser, Privity? - An Obsolete
Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 507,
510 (1976). More recently, the Court of Appeals left another indelible mark on this area
of the law with Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483
N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985). One commentator has pointed out that, "[tihe
opinions of the courts in New York, the state of origin of Ultramares and Glanzer, re-
quire closer attention because they frequently are cited in opinions of other jurisdictions,
particularly in cases of first impression." R. James Gormley, The Foreseen, The Foresee-
able, and Beyond - Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL L. Rav. 528,
536 (1984).
27. See Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 581, 427
N.Y.S.2d 604, 608, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (1980) (commenting that New York has a "recog-
nized interest in maintaining and fostering its undisputed status as the pre-eminent
commercial and financial nerve center of the Nation and the world") (citing Bache & Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) and International
Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817
(1969)); see also United States v. Russel, 582 F. Supp. 660, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (refer-
ring to New York as "the commercial center of the United States (and perhaps the
world) . . .").
19931
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gated it. Security Pacific's dictate rings loud and clear: There is
no tort of negligent misrepresentation in New York.
Part III will discuss Security Pacific, in detail, with a view
toward its potential implications. Part IV of this Note will argue
that the New York Court of Appeals' limitation of accountants'
liability for negligent misrepresentation to the domain of con-
tract law is a clear signal that the New York Legislature should
take action. Tort liability in this area of the law is needed; how-
ever, only the legislature can draw boundaries that provide an
equitable result for the injured third parties involved without
imposing an onerous financial burden on accountants.
The New York Legislature should render negligent account-
ants liable to all reasonably foreseeable parties who legitimately
rely on their audit work. In doing so, the legislature should also
use the tools it has available to combat the exposure of account-
ants to inordinate liability. As the accounting profession itself
points out, the premier factor causing this exposure is joint and
several liability. This Note will focus on the use of this suggested
legislative tool for limiting accountants' liability. Part IV will ar-
gue that the current joint and several liability system in New
York should be eliminated and replaced with one that only
holds accountants liable for their negligence, not the negligence
of others.2 8
28. The New York Legislature has adopted the comparative negligence doctrine.
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976). However, the legislature has only par-
tially abrogated the joint and several liability rule. In 1986, the legislature enacted Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) article 16, which states in part:
[W]hen a verdict or decision in an action or claim for personal injury is deter-
mined in favor of a claimant in an action involving two or more tortfeasors jointly
liable . . . and the liability of a defendant is found to be fifty percent or less of the
total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of such defendant to the
claimant for non-economic loss shall not exceed that defendant's equitable share
determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing or
contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss ....
Id. § 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1993). This modification, however, has no impact on ac-
countants' liability; the common law rule of joint and several liability remains in this
context for two reasons. First, actions brought by third parties against accountants are
not "personal injury" actions. See Becker v. Elm Air Conditioning Corp., 143 A.D.2d 965,
966, 533 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606 (2d Dep't 1988). Second, these actions always involve eco-
nomic loss. As the practice commentaries to CPLR § 1600 point out, "[a]s to purely
economic losses, the old law continues in full force-all defendants are jointly and sever-
ally liable to the plaintiff." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1600 practice commentaries at 200
(McKinney Supp. 1993).
[Vol. 13:763
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II. Background
A. The Accountant's Role in the Current Business
Environment
Fifty years ago, when the accounting profession was in its
infancy, an accountant's mission in conducting an audit was to
assess management's stewardship of the business.29 "[T]he ac-
countant's primary duties included assisting management in
identifying problematic situations such as inferior accounting
procedures, employee theft and fraud, unintentional mistakes
and undiscovered shortages."30 Over the years, as the accounting
profession developed more advanced procedures for conducting
audits, this mission was transformed.31 Currently, the accounting
profession itself, as well as several courts and commentators,
perceive the contemporary role of an audit in an entirely differ-
ent light.2 Today, in most cases, an audit is requested because a
third party, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 3
or a potential lender, requires independent verification that a
business's financial statements, 4 taken as a whole, are presented
29. Judah Septimus, Accountants' Liability for Negligence - A Contemporary
Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404-05 (1979).
30. Brian K. Kirby & Thomas L. Davies, Accountant Liability: New Exposure for
an Old Profession, 36 S.D. L. REV. 574, 577 (1991).
31. Kirby & Davies, supra note 30, at 577; Septimus, supra note 29, at 401-08.
32. See generally Kirby & Davies, supra note 30, at 576-78.
33. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 13, 48 Stat. 881, 894 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (1988), requires public companies to file with the Commission "an-
nual reports, certified . . .by independent public accountants, and such quarterly re-
ports, as the Commission may prescribe." Id.
34. The financial statements of a company are generally composed of four docu-
ments: a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a Statement of Retained Earnings, and a
Statement of Cash Flows. The function of each is as follows:
1. Balance Sheet - presents a "snap-shot" view of the assets, liabilities, and equity
of an enterprise at a particular moment in time, generally as of the last day in a
company's operating period.
2. Income Statement - summarizes the results of an enterprise's operating activi-
ties over the course of the operating period. It generally reports sales, cost of
goods sold, operating expenses, gains or losses and the bottom line net income or
loss.
3. Statement of Retained Earnings - reports the events that have occurred during
the operating period which impact the cumulative earnings of the enterprise.
These events include: net income or loss, payment of dividends, and any adjust-
ments of income from previous operating periods. This information can be re-
ported in a separate statement or can be included on the income statement.
9
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fairly. 5
The accounting profession has issued several pronounce-
ments that recognize this new role. These pronouncements em-
phasize that an auditor no longer serves solely the client, but
also third parties who rely on the auditor's work. First among
these is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
(AICPA's) professional standards, which state:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its respon-
sibility to the public. The accounting profession's public consists
of clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the
business and financial community, and others who rely on the ob-
jectivity and integrity of certified public accountants to maintain
the orderly functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a
public interest responsibility on certified public accountants."0
In addition, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, a
body created by the accounting profession to establish accept-
able accounting principles and financial reporting standards, has
commented:
The effectiveness of individuals, enterprises, markets, and govern-
ment in allocating scarce resources among competing uses is en-
hanced if those who make economic decisions have information
that reflects the relative standing and performance of business
enterprises to assist them in evaluating alternative courses of ac-
tion and the expected returns, costs, and risks of each .... Inde-
pendent auditors commonly examine or review financial state-
ments . . . and those who use that information often view an
independent auditor's opinion as enhancing the reliability or
credibility of the information."
Recently, the AICPA reiterated that "the audit provides in-
vestors, bankers, creditors, and others with reasonable assurance
4. Statement of Cash Flows - reports the activities that constitute sources and
uses of cash during the operating period. The sources and uses of cash are organ-
ized into three categories: operating, financing, and investing activities. This state-
ment also reconciles these activities to net income or loss by detailing certain non-
cash items (i.e., depreciation).
See generally DOUGLAS R. CARMICHAEL ET AL., ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK (7th ed. 1991).
35. DAVID N. RICCHIUTE, ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS 6 (1982).
36. AICPA, 2 PROF. STAND. (CCH) ET § 53.01 (1988).
37. 2 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS AS OF JUNE 1, 1992, at 695-710 (1992).
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that the financial statements are free of material
misstatement."38
As the accounting profession acknowledges, various mem-
bers of the business community rely on the auditor's work in
making crucial business decisions.1 These members include
creditors such as banks, suppliers and vendors, and investors
such as individuals, mutual funds, and venture capitalists. "° One
commentator has noted that "a variety of third parties may rely
on financial statements to evaluate the client for credit-worthi-
ness, investment potential, or any other purpose that may affect
a decision to contract with the client.' 1
Courts have also evaluated the accountant's role in the con-
temporary business setting. First and foremost is the Supreme
Court of the United States, which has commented:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corpora-
tion's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client. The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors
and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust.4 2
The New Jersey Supreme Court has also concluded that
"[t]he auditor's function has expanded from that of a watchdog
for management to an independent evaluator of the adequacy
and fairness of financial statements issued by [the company's]
management to stockholders, creditors, and others." ' s The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has added: "If relying third parties, such
as creditors, are not allowed to recover, the cost of credit to the
38. AICPA, UNDERSTANDING AUDITS AND THE AUDITOR'S REPORT, A GUIDE FOR FINAN-
CIAL STATEMENT USERS 36 (1989).
39. John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third Party Rights:
Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability, 22 GA. L. REV. 149, 149
(1987).
40. See John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental
Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1932 (1988).
41. Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 39, at 149.
42. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
43. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983).
1993]
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general public will increase because creditors will either have to
absorb the costs of bad loans made in reliance on faulty infor-
mation or hire independent accountants to verify the informa-
tion received. 4
4
More recently, the California Supreme Court has com-
mented, "audits of financial statements and the resulting audit
reports are very frequently (if not universally) used by busi-
nesses to establish the financial credibility of their enterprises in
the perceptions of outside persons, e.g., . . . [those] who extend
credit to an enterprise or make risk-oriented decisions based on
its economic viability. ' 45 In short, the auditor's assurance that
an enterprise's financial condition is reported fairly plays an es-
sential role in the facilitation of commercial intercourse.
B. The Audit Function
Audit services constitute a major portion of the work that
accountants offer to their clients. 4s A typical audit is conducted
by a Certified Public Accountant 47 (CPA), and involves an ex-
amination of a client's books and records in order to determine
44. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Wis. 1983).
45. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 751 (Cal. 1992)
46. Other services that accountants can provide to their clients are compilation, tax,
and management advisory (consulting) services. A recent breakdown of Big Six revenues
has revealed the following:
PERCENTAGE OF REVENUES
Management
FIRM Auditing Tax Consulting
Arthur Andersen 35% 21% 44%
Ernst & Young 53% 25% 22%
Deloitte & Touche 57% 23% 20%
KPMG Peat Marwick 53% 27% 20%
Coopers & Lybrand 56% 19% 25%
Price Waterhouse 48% 28% 24%
BOWMAN'S ACCOUNTING REPORT, cited in Rahul Jacob, Can You Trust That Audit?, FOR-
TUNE, Nov. 18, 1991, at 191.
47. The most common barometer of competence in the accounting profession is the
license to practice as a CPA. CARMICHAEL, supra note 34, at 2-5. Although there is dis-
parity from state to state as to the prerequisites for this license, generally a candidate
must: satisfy certain educational criteria, for example, obtain a college degree and com-
plete a certain number of accounting courses; pass the Uniform CPA Examination; and
have a certain number of years experience in public accounting. Id. at 2-6. In addition,
after the license is issued, most states require that licensees obtain a minimum number
"continuing professional education" credits. Id.
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whether they are stated in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 48 The standard of care governing
the CPA's conduct over the course of the audit is promulgated
by the AICPA through a body of rules referred to as Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). 49 The results of the audit
examination are communicated to the company's management
through an independent audit opinion.50
It is imperative to note that an audit is not a guarantee of
the accuracy of financial statements; the costs of obtaining such
assurance would be exorbitant.5 1 Invariably, practical considera-
48. GAAP constitute "[tihe standards and conventions that guide accountants in
the preparation of financial statements . . . These principles are [derived from] ...
practices sanctioned by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. GAAP
may also include certain practices that are widely followed or commonly advocated in
the accounting literature." RALPH EsTEs, DICTIONARY OF ACCOUNTING 60 (2d ed. 1985).
49. An audit conducted in accordance with GAAS involves six phases. The auditor
must:
1. Plan the audit and make an initial assessment of what work is required to be
done. This plan remains flexible and must be modified if the engagement so re-
quires. The plan, and subsequent modifications are recorded on the "Audit Pro-
gram," which serves as a checklist for the work that must be completed over the
course of the audit.
2. Make a preliminary evaluation of the client's internal control structure.
3. Perform compliance testing to assess the adequacy of the client's internal con-
trol structure. By doing this the auditor determines whether this structure can be
relied on.
4. Adjust the Audit Program to reflect the reliability of the amount of substantive
work that is needed based on the strength of the client's internal control
structure.
5. Perform the substantive work, and
6. Issue an opinion, see infra note 50, based on the results of the work performed.
See JERRY D. SULLIVAN ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 183-84 (10th ed. 1985); see also
Willis W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountant's Liability for Malpractice: Effect of
Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 67-68 (1987).
50. There are four types of reports that an auditor can issue after the audit exami-
nation. The first is the prized "unqualified" or "clean" opinion; stating that the financial
statements are a fair representation of the financial position of the enterprise and are
presented in accordance with GAAP. The second, a "qualified" opinion, is issued when
an aspect of the financial statements are not presented in accordance with GAAP, or
when there are material uncertainties that could impact the presentation of the financial
statements. The third type of report is an "adverse" opinion, which is tantamount to a
rejection of the fairness of the presentation. This occurs when the financial statements
seriously depart from GAAP. In the final report, a "disclaimer of opinion," the auditor is
unable to register an opinion concerning the presentation of the client's financial state-
ments due to significant inadequacies in the client's financial reporting system. AICPA, 1
PROF. STAND. (CCH) AU § 150.01 (1982).
51. See Hagen, supra note 5, at 209. Professor Hagen has pointed out that "[tihe
1993]
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tions forbid an examination of every transaction a business has
consummated.2  Accordingly, the auditor chooses a sample of
transactions to be reviewed and, in most audits, great reliance is
placed on a business's internal control system.6 3 In sum, an audit
provides reasonable assurance that the financial statements,
taken as a whole, are presented fairly.
C. Negligent Misrepresentation Under Contract Principles
The New York Court of Appeals' landmark decision in Ul-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, 4 established the first governing prin-
ciples for measuring accountants' liability to third parties for
negligent misrepresentation. 55 Although negligent misrepresen-
tation is typically thought of as a creature of tort law, 6 the
court, speaking through Chief Judge Cardozo, applied what have
evolved today as contract-law principles to this cause of action. 7
The defendant-accountant in Ultramares was hired to pre-
pare and certify the balance sheet of a business engaged in the
importation of rubber .5 8 At no time, before or during its audit
work, was the defendant aware that the plaintiff, a lender of the
certification 'of financial statements does not guarantee that the financial statements are
free from all defects, but rather is an opinion that the financial statements present fairly
the financial position, income from operations, and changes in financial position in accor-
dance with generally accepted accounting principles." Id.
52. Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants' Liability, 1988
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 213, 234.
53. Id.; Hagen, supra note 49, at 68.
54. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
55. See id. at 179-89, 174 N.E. at 444-48; Besser, supra note 26, at 510.
56. See supra note 20.
57. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. This is not to say, however, that
the negligent misrepresentation cause of action does not contain elements of tort law;
but these elements go to the determination of whether an accountant has breached the
contract with his client. In accepting an engagement, an accountant implicitly promises
to use due care in the exercise of his professional judgment. Security Pac. Business
Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 695, 702, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1083, 586
N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (1992); Iselin & Co. v. Mann Judd Landeau, 71 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 522
N.E.2d 21, 23, 527 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178 (1988). Assessing whether this promise has been
broken requires a court to determine whether an accountant has conformed to the stan-
dard of care that would be used by an ordinarily prudent accountant - in essence a
tort law negligence analysis. If the accountant is found negligent, there has been a breach
of contract. However, under Ultramares, once a breach of contract is determined, the
scope of the liability is measured solely through the application of contract law princi-
ples. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
58. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
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importer, would rely on its audit.5 9 After finishing its audit work,
the defendant issued its certificate to the importer verifying it
had positive net worth; in turn, as a condition for certain loans,
the importer provided the certificate to the plaintiff.60 Nine
months later, the importer declared bankruptcy.6' Soon thereaf-
ter, the plaintiff brought suit claiming that it had relied on the
certificate in extending credit to the importer and that the de-
fendant's negligent audit had caused its loss.62
Although the court concluded that the defendant had in
fact conducted its audit in a negligent manner, it nevertheless
dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claim because of the plain-
tiff's lack of privity with the defendant. 3 Chief Judge Cardozo
noted that "[t]he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceed-
ing in these days apace,"6 4 but halted the assault in Ul-
59. Id. Although the defendant knew that in the "usual course of business" the im-
porter would exhibit the certified balance sheet to "banks, creditors, stockholders, pur-
chasers or sellers," the defendant was unaware that the particular plaintiff would rely on
its audit. Id. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
60. Id. at 174-75, 174 N.E. at 442-43.
61. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445. "Privity" refers to the nexus between parties to a
contract. Id.; 4 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778 (1951); see also Ralph
Wolff & Sons v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 58 S.W.2d 623, 624-25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933). The
"citadel of privity" is a metaphor for a doctrine fundamental to old common law: a third
person, not a party to a contract, has no right to sue for a breach of it. KEETON, supra
note 9, § 93, at 669. The foundation of the citadel is found in the landmark English case,
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom, a mail com-
pany and Wright entered into a contract, in which Wright promised to keep a certain
mailcoach in good repair. Id. at 402-03. When the mailcoach subsequently collapsed, its
driver, who was injured in the accident, brought suit against Wright. Id. at 403. The
Court of Exchequer denied recovery reasoning:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue,
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by
the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the
operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
Id. at 405. The rule that evolved from this case was that a third-party, nonprivy could
not recover in negligence for either personal or economic injury. KEETON, supra note 9,
§ 93, at 668-69. The "assault" on the doctrine of privity began in New York with Law-
rence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). In that case, Holly loaned Fox $300 in consideration of
Fox's promise to pay Lawrence. Id. at 269. When Fox refused to pay, Lawrence brought
suit. Id. The Court of Appeals allowed Lawrence to sustain his suit and in doing so
stated:
"[Ulpon the principle of law long recognized and clearly established, that when
15
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tramares6 6 In his oft-quoted passage, he cited the unique attrib-
utes of the accounting profession that justified the maintenance
of the privity barrier:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as
to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication
of a duty that exposes to these consequences. 6
In distinguishing Ultramares from an earlier decision he
also authored, Glanzer v. Shepard,6 7 Chief Judge Cardozo re-
vealed his use of contract-law principles. In Glanzer, the plain-
tiff purchased beans, the price of which was to be determined by
the defendant, who was a public weigher hired by the seller. 8
The defendant weighed the beans as contracted and issued a
certificate to both the plaintiff and the seller verifying the
weight and referencing both parties.6 9 After the plaintiff had
paid for the beans relying upon this certificate, he discovered
that the weight cited was overstated. 0 Ultimately, the plaintiff
one person, for a valuable consideration, engages with another, by a simple con-
tract, to do some act for the benefit of a third, the latter, who would enjoy the
benefit of the act, may maintain an action for the breach of such engagement; that
it does not rest upon the ground of any actual or supposed relationship between
the parties as some of the earlier cases would seem to indicate, but upon the
broader and more satisfactory basis, that the law operating on the act of the par-
ties creates the duty, establishes a privity, and implies the promise and obligation
on which the action is founded."
Id. at 272 (quoting Brewer v. Dyer, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 337, 340-41 (1853)). The assault
continued in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), where
Judge Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, obviated the requirement of
privity where a negligent breach of contract resulted in personal injuries. Id. at 389-94,
111 N.E. at 1053-55. However, in claims involving solely economic injury, remnants of
the citadel remain. KEETON, supra note 9, § 97, at 690. Indeed, negligent misrepresenta-
tion is one such remnant. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 445.
65. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447 (concluding that "nothing in
our previous decisions commits us to a holding of liability for negligence in the circum-
stances of the case at hand ....").
66. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
67. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
68. Id. at 237-38, 135 N.E. at 275.
69. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275.
70. Id.
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brought a negligent misrepresentation claim against the weigher
seeking to recover the amount overpaid. 7' Despite the plaintiff's
lack of privity, the court allowed the claim to stand.72
Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that in Glanzer, the nexus
between the plaintiff-purchaser and defendant-weigher was ten-
able enough to support liability. 73 In Glanzer, the defendant-
weigher was aware of the "end and aim of the transaction"74 and
knew his services would be relied upon by the nonprivy party.7 5
Although the seller was the promisee, he was so only in name
because the contract was in essence for the benefit of the
buyer.7" Although Chief Judge Cardozo analyzed Glanzer in
terms of duty, he recognized that the same result could have
been reached by the use of contract-law principles. 77 In distin-
guishing Ultramares, he reasoned that "the service was primar-
ily for the benefit of [the importer], a convenient instrumental-
ity for use in the development of the business, and only
incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom [the im-
porter] and his associates might exhibit it thereafter. '78
The fledgling contract principles referred to in Ultrarmares
have evolved into a distinct species of contract law.79 These
principles form the basis for what is referred to today as third-
party beneficiary law. ° Section 302 of the Second Restatement
71. Id.
72. Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
73. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445.
74. Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445 (quoting Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at
275).
75. In Ultramares, Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that:
[In Glanzer,][t]he bond was so close as to approach that of privity, if not com-
pletely one with it. Not so in the case at hand. No one would be likely to urge that
there was a contractual relation, or even one approaching it, at the root of any
duty that was owing from the defendants now before us to the indeterminate class
of persons who, presently or in the future might deal with the [importer] in reli-
ance on the audit. In a word, the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v.
Shepard was primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in
name, a party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal
promisee.
Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
78. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
79. See CORaIN, supra note 64, § 772.
80. Id.
1993]
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of Contracts segregates third-party beneficiaries into two catego-
ries: intended and incidental.8 ' It provides:
[A] beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recogni-
tion of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
82
Section 302 defines an incidental beneficiary in a residual
manner: "An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an
intended beneficiary."s If a plaintiff is able to show that it is an
intended beneficiary of a contract, the-plaintiff has standing to
sue.8" Conversely, if a court deems the plaintiff to be simply an
incidental beneficiary, the plaintiff's suit cannot be sustained.85
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979). In Fourth Ocean Putnam
Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 66 N.Y.2d 38, 485 N.E.2d 208, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1985),
the Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement's intended and incidental third-party
beneficiary distinction. Id. at 44, 495 N.E.2d at 212, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 5 ("We think that
the Restatement formulations state the essence of the prior holdings of this court .....
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1979).
83. Id. § 302(2).
84. Id. § 304 (stating that "[a] promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor
to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may
enforce the duty."). The seminal third-party beneficiary case in New York standing for
this proposition is Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918). In Seaver, a
dying testatrix desired to leave a remainder interest in real property to her favorite
niece. Id. at 235, 120 N.E. at 639. Due to her impending death, the testatrix signed a will,
which did not provide for this devise, on the condition that her husband promise to leave
the niece enough in his will to "make up the difference." Id. at 235-36, 120 N.E. at 639-
40. When the husband died, it was discovered that he made no such provision in his will.
Id. at 236, 120 N.E. at 640. The niece brought suit against his estate, and despite her
lack of privity to the contract between the testatrix and her husband, the Court of Ap-
peals sustained her claim. Id. at 239, 120 N.E. at 642. In doing so, the court noted the
legal principle that when a contract is made for the direct benefit of a third party, that
party may sue for a breach of it. Id. at 237-38, 120 N.E. at 641.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 315 (providing that "[an] incidental
beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the promisor or the prom-
isee."). Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 98 A.D.2d 424, 469 N.Y.S.2d 948 (2d Dep't 1983), is a
good example of an incidental third-party beneficiary case. That case arose out of the
infamous blackout of 1977. The plaintiff was a tenant in an apartment building to which
the defendant had contracted to supply power. Id. at 424, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949. The
plaintiff brought suit after falling down the basement stairs of the building in the dark-
[Vol. 13:763
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The principles of Ultramares and Glanzer may be restated
in the contemporary parlance of the Restatement. In Glanzer,
the plaintiff-purchaser was able to show that it was an intended
third-party beneficiary because the circumstances indicated that
the seller (promisee) intended to give the plaintiff-purchaser
(beneficiary) the benefit of its contracted performance. In Ul-
tramares, however, the plaintiff-lender was deemed only an inci-
dental beneficiary because the circumstances did not indicate
that the importer (promisee) had intended that the benefit of its
performance would inure to it."6
D. Negligent Misrepresentation Under Tort Principles
Although initially adopted and endorsed across the coun-
try, 7 the strict privity standard imposed by Ultramares [herein-
ness. Id. In dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the court held that:
"An incidental beneficiary is a third party who may derive benefit from the per-
formance of a contract though he is neither the promisee nor the one to whom
performance is to be rendered." ... The contract must evince a discernible intent
to allow recovery for the specific damages to the third party that result from a
breach thereof before a cause of action is stated .... Plaintiff has failed to carry
his burden of demonstrating that he has an enforceable right. He offers nothing to
show that [the defendant and the building owner] intended to allow him to re-
cover for the damages resulting from his entrance into the darkened common
areas.
Id. at 426-27, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (quoting Airco Alloys Div. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 76 A.D.2d 68, 79, 430 N.Y.S.2d 179, 185-86 (4th Dep't 1980)) (citations omitted).
86. See supra text accompanying note 82. The comparison of the rule of Ultramares
and Glanzer to the third-party beneficiary rule of contract law is not a novel approach.
In discussing the symmetry of these theories one commentator explained:
Under the equivalence of privity requirement of Ultramares-Glanzer, an account-
ant will be liable for negligence only to those parties who are in a "contractual
relationship or its equivalent" with the accountant. This rule, in effect, limits the
scope of an accountant's negligence liability to the parties which would have a
right to a remedy under ordinary contract law. The absence of privity ... gener-
ally precludes a right to recover on a contract. One exception is a third party
beneficiary contract, where a noncontracting party can enforce the contract if the
contracting parties intended to confer directly a benefit upon the third party.
Similarly, under the principles of Ultramares-Glanzer, a noncontracting party
cannot recover for the negligence of an accountant unless the "end and aim of the
transaction" was for the specific purpose of benefiting that particular third party.
Hagen, supra note 5, at 195-96.
87. See Hagen, supra note 5, at 184 (stating in 1988 that "the holding of Ul-
tramares was the prevailing principle of law for almost forty years .... "); see also Bes-
ser, supra note 26, at 516 (commenting in 1976 that "[flor over thirty years Ultramares
and its progeny raised the shield of privity .... ").
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after the "Privity Approach"] has recently lost some of its vital-
ity.s8 Currently, there are two other methodologies used to
measure an accountant's liability to a nonclient - the Restate-
ment of Torts Approach 9 [hereinafter the "Restatement Ap-
proach"] and the Foreseeability Approach. 0 Both of these ap-
proaches apply tort principles to the negligent misrepresentation
cause of action."
88. See Besser, supra note 26, at 541 (exulting, "Ultramares is on the wane, and
rightly so!"); see also Hagen, supra note 5, at 184. In addition to New York, the following
jurisdictions have adopted or retained the privity approach by common law, statute, or
both: Alabama: Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989); Arkan-
sas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie Supp. 1991); Colorado: Stephens Indus. v.
Haskins and Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colorado law); Delaware:
Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del. 1990); Illinois:
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 225, § 450/30.1 (Michie 1993); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402
(1991); Nebraska: Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989);
Pennsylvania: Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). At least 17 states have adopted
the Restatement of Torts' more expansive approach to liability: California: Bily v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Florida: First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell
& Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Georgia: Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga.
1987); Iowa: Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Kentucky: Ingram
Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (applying Kentucky law); Louisiana:
First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990)
(applying Louisiana law); Michigan: Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockier, P.C. v. Rose,
436 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), leave to appeal denied, 450 N.W.2d 270 (Mich.
1990); Minnesota: Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Missouri: Lindner
Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); New Hampshire: Spherex, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982); North Dakota: Bunge Corp. v. Eide,
372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974) (applying North Dakota law); Ohio: Haddon View Inv.
Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982); Rhode Island: Rusch Factors,
Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (applying Rhode Island law); Tennessee:
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); Texas: Shat-
terproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Washington: Ha-
berman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987), modified,
750 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1988); West Virginia: First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310
(W. Va. 1989).
90. Three states currently adhere to the foreseeability standard: Mississippi: Touche
Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); New Jersey: H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 444 A.2d 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Wisconsin: Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
91. The difference between tort and contract liability has been summarized as
follows:
Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by law - apart from
and independent of promises made and therefore apart from the manifested in-
tention of the parties - to avoid injury to others. By injury here is meant simply
the interference with the individual's interest or an interest of some other legal
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/14
SECURITY PACIFIC
The Restatement Approach is derived from Section 552 of
the Second Restatement of Torts, which provides that liability
for one who negligently supplies information to another is lim-
ited to loss suffered:
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.92
The Restatement has been interpreted to expand potential lia-
bility to a particular party or group of parties actually foreseen
to have relied on the financial statements. 3
entity that is deemed worthy of legal protection.
KEETON, supra note 9, § 92, at 655. The Restatement and Foreseeability Approaches
expose an accountant to liability from third parties to whom the accountant has not
specifically assumed a duty to make reparation. The classification of the negligent mis-
representation cause of action as a tort action as opposed to a contract action has signifi-
cant implications beyond academic tidiness; by characterizing the action as a tort, courts
have widely expanded the pool of viable third-party plaintiffs, which has resulted in
drastically increased liability exposure for accountants.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
93. See Kirby & Davies, supra note 30, at 584. The illustrations to comment (h) of
section 552 help to elucidate the Restatement Approach. Illustration number five poses
the following hypothetical:
A is negotiating with X Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank requires an audit
by independent public accountants. A employs B & Company, a firm of account-
ants, to make the audit, telling them that the purpose of the audit is to meet the
requirements of X Bank in connection with a credit of $50,000. B & Company
agree to make the audit, with the express understanding that it is for transmission
to X Bank only. X Bank fails, and A, without any further communication with B
& Company, submits its financial statements accompanied by B & Company's
opinion to Y Bank, which in reliance upon it extends a credit of $50,000 to A. The
audit is so carelessly made as to result in an unqualified favorable opinion on
financial statements that materially misstate the financial position to A, and in
consequence Y Bank suffers pecuniary loss through its extension of credit.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5 (1977).
Based on these facts, the Restatement reaches the conclusion that "B & Company is
not liable to Y Bank." Conversely, the Restatement provides that the accountant would
be subject to liability if in the above hypothetical: "nothing is said about supplying the
information for the guidance of X Bank only .... " And "A merely informs B & Com-
pany that he expects to negotiate a bank loan, for $50,000," and that he "requires the
audit for the purpose of the loan, and has X Bank in mind." Id. § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5
(1977).
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The Foreseeability Approach, on the other hand, applies the
traditional precepts of tort law to the negligent misrepresenta-
tion cause of action. In essence, the formulation of this approach
is that: "When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion...
he has a duty to all those whom that auditor should reasonably
foresee as recipients from the company of the statements for its
proper business purposes, provided that the recipients rely on
the statements pursuant to those business purposes. '9 4
Both the courts and the commentators who have endorsed
one of these tort approaches have consistently pointed to the
policy reasons justifying their positions. 5 The proponents of the
Foreseeability Approach argue vigorously that the nature of an
audit has changed since Ultramares; that audits are no longer
for the sole benefit of management, but are predominantly for
the benefit of third parties.9 " The endorsers of this standard also
contend that the increased liability exposure of the accounting
profession is not onerous because accountants are able to deflect
the increased risk. 7 Two vehicles facilitate this deflection: the
availability of insurance; and the ability of accountants to raise
their fees to cover the inevitable increases in liability
premiums.9e
The proponents of the Foreseeability Approach also point
out that by extending accountants' potential exposure, the
courts are creating a significant impetus for accountants to be
94. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983).
95. See sources cited infra notes 96-116.
96. See Howard B. Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Account-
ant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 250 (1983) (noting that
"[als to the function of the audit itself there has indeed been a considerable change since
1931 in the relationship between accounting firms and third persons."). See discussion
supra part II.A.
97. Adler, 461 A.2d at 151. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that:
Independent auditors have apparently been able to obtain liability insurance cov-
ering these risks or otherwise to satisfy their financial obligations. We have no
reason to believe that they may not purchase malpractice insurance policies that
cover their negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who
receive the audit from the company pursuant to a proper business purpose.
Id.
98. Hagen, supra note 5, at 207-08. Professor Hagen argues that "the accounting
profession can include the cost of their malpractice insurance in their billing rates,
thereby apportioning the cost of the risk of liability based on the amount of audit work
necessary to prevent misleading financial statements." Id.
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more careful and are thereby aiding in the heightened accuracy
of financial disclosure.9 The critics of the Foreseeability Ap-
proach are many.1 °0 These antagonists contend that the support-
ers' efforts to dismiss the risk of inordinate liability are mis-
guided.01 The opponents assert that malpractice insurance is
hardly a panacea for the massive liability exposure that the
Foreseeability Approach invokes.102
The endorsers of the Restatement Approach also point to
several policy justifications for their position. This approach is
put forward as a prudent compromise between the extremes of
the Privity and Foreseeability Approaches.0 3 The advocates of
this position extract arguments from both sides. 04 In imposing
the rigid privity barrier, they would agree that the courts are
needlessly insulating accountants from liability.10 5 However, the
Restatement Approach proponents also agree that there is a
need to limit the potentiality of liability wholly inordinate from
the gravity of the wrong. 0 6 Thus, they contend that this ap-
proach offers the best of both worlds. 07 Critics of the Restate-
99. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Wis. 1983).
In adopting the Foreseeability Approach, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that: "Un-
less liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of the financial state-
ments will not be protected. Unless an accountant can be held liable to a relying third
party, this negligence will go undeterred." Id.
100. See, e.g., Siliciano, supra note 40; Gormley, supra note 26; Stephen M. Lazare,
Note, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an Audi-
tor's Legal Duty, 48 ALB. L. REV. 876 (1984).
101. See generally, sources cited infra note 109-18.
102. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
103. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 759 (Cal. 1992).
104. Id. at 769. The California Supreme Court recently adopted the Restatement
Approach because the Restatement "attempts to define a narrow and circumscribed class
of persons to whom or for whom representations are made .... The Restatement rule
thus appears to be a sensible and moderate approach to the potential consequences of
imposing unlimited negligence liability .... " Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 767. In rebuking the Foreseeability Approach, the California Supreme
Court commented:
In our judgment, a foreseeability rule applied in this context inevitably produces
large numbers of expensive and complex lawsuits of questionable merit as scores
of investors and lenders seek to recoup business losses . . . . [In adopting the
Restatement Approach], we seek to deter careless audit reporting while avoiding
the specter of a level of liability that is morally and economically excessive.
Id.
107. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 311-12 (W. Va. 1989)
(rejecting both the Foreseeability and Privity Approaches and adopting the "middle
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ment Approach methodology maintain it is founded on capri-
cious line-drawing, and offers accountants little notice as to
whom they can be held liable.10 8
The proponents for retaining the Ultramares Privity Ap-
proach retort that the policy considerations endorsed by the
Foreseeability and Restatement Approach advocates are falla-
cious."°9 The Privity Approach endorsers generally acknowledge
that the accountants' work is used more by third parties, but
contend that this is an illogical basis for jettisoning the privity
barrier."0 The central underlying policy reason behind the erec-
tion of the privity barrier - to protect accountants from inde-
terminate liability - is still very relevant."" Accountants, they
argue, are still at risk of being subjected to inordinate liability as
a result of a single, good-faith mistake." 2 Indeed, the fact that
more third parties are relying on accountants' work only exacer-
bates this risk."' In addition, the Privity Approach advocates
maintain that accountants are not able to deflect this risk. They
point to empirical data showing: the meteoric rise in insurance
premiums," 4 the high percentage of accounting firms operating
without insurance, 1 5 and the recent failure of two large account-
ground" offered by the Restatement).
108. Wiener, supra note 96, at 252. Judge Wiener used comment (h) of the Restate-
ment, see supra note 93, to illustrate the fortuity of the Restatement Approach:
Where A negotiates with X bank for $50,000 credit and the bank requires an audit
by independent public accountants, the accountants will be liable only to X bank
for a negligent misrepresentation. If fortuitously, A had decided to go to Y bank
for credit, the accounting firm would not be liable. The placing of liability on the
fortuitousness of whether the name of the bank is disclosed or whether a class of
lending institutions were known to the accounting firm may be a comfortable line
to be drawn by those preparing the Restatement, but it does not appear to rest
upon sound analytical considerations.
Id.
109. See Lazare, supra note 100, at 914.
110. See Gossman, supra note 52, at 232.
111. See, e.g., id. at 239; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
112. Lazare, supra note 100, at 902.
113. Id.
114. Studies indicate that between 1984 and 1987, accounting malpractice insurance
premiums for some firms increased by five-fold. Robert Mednick, Accountants' Liability:
Coping With the Stampede to the Courtroom, J. ACCT., Sept. 1987, at 118.
115. In a recent Board Endorsement, the AICPA reported that 40% of firms other
than the Big Six are conducting business without malpractice insurance. See AICPA
BOARD ENDORSEMENT, supra note 6, at 18.
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ing firms.1 '
Finally, the Privity Approach advocates contend that the
argument that the courts will encourage more careful accounting
is specious; the inherent limitations in an audit make this so." 7
An audit requires several judgment decisions that make it a
form of "art," rather than any scientific process. Under this ar-
gument, the accountant, based on his or her experience and
knowledge, will make the same decisions as to the amount and
course of the work."'
E. The Emergence of the Tot of Negligent Misrepresentation
in New York?
In New York, the first courts to follow Ultramares strictly
applied its contract principles." 9 However, the language of the
Court of Appeals' opinion in White v. Guarente'20 suggested
that New York might begin to follow the nationwide trend of
reducing the rigors of Ultramares.'2 '
In White, the defendant, Arthur Andersen & Co., a national
accounting firm, was retained by Guarente-Harrington Associ-
ates, a limited partnership, to perform audit and tax services.'22
The plaintiff was one of the limited partners of Guarente-Har-
rington Associates.'23 The plaintiff's claim alleged that Andersen
had negligently issued its auditor's report by failing to notify
him that the general partners had withdrawn funds from their
116. See THE LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 6, at 21. In 1990, the seventh-largest ac-
counting firm in the country, Laventhol & Horwath, buckled due to financial decay. In
1992, Pannell Kerr Foster, another large accounting firm sold off approximately 90% of
its offices. Id.
117. See Gossman, supra note 52, at 233-34.
118. Id. Professor Gossman argues that:
As with many other professional services, auditing involves as much art as science.
An auditor is forced to make many decisions, and to adjust audit procedure to
meet the circumstances of each audit .... The proper accounting treatment of
some matters may not be settled, some of the basic data upon which an auditor
must rely are not as a practical matter verifiable, and an auditor is not required to
investigate every supporting document, but must rely on sampling.
Id.
119. See Besser, supra note 26, at 508.
120. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
121. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
122. White, 43 N.Y.2d at 359, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
123. Id. at 358-59, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
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capital accounts in violation of the partnership agreement. '24
In allowing the claim to stand, the court commented that
"this plaintiff seeks redress, not as a mere member of the public,
but as one of a settled and particularized class among the mem-
bers of which the report would be circulated . *.". ." 5 It further
noted that, "the accountant must have been aware that a limited
partner would necessarily rely on [Andersen's work]. ' 26 Thus,
rather than focusing on the plaintiffs status as a surrogate for
the formal promisee, the court in White injected aspects of fore-
seeability into the calculus of "the relationship approaching
privity. ' 27 If the language of White is taken at face value, s the
court, in extending an accountant's liability to a limited class of
persons foreseen to rely on the audit opinion, would have taken
the first step toward applying tort law principles to the negligent
misrepresentation cause of action.
More specifically, the reasoning of White seemed to 'em-
124. Id. at 360, 372 N.E.2d 317-18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
125. Id. at 363, 401 N.E.2d at 320, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
126. Id. at 361, 401 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
127. Id. The interesting aspect of White is that the court could have decided the
case on more restrictive grounds. Since the plaintiffs were limited partners, they could
have been considered actual privies to the contract between Andersen and the limited
partnership. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d at 550 n.9,
483 N.E.2d at 117 n.9, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 442 n.9 (1985); Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F.
Supp. 370, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Calamari v. Grace, 98 A.D.2d 74, 81-82, 469
N.Y.S.2d 942, 946-47 (2d Dep't 1983). Instead, the court's opinion is replete with expan-
sive language characterizing the plaintiffs as "a known group" and not "a faceless or
unresolved class of persons." White, 43 N.Y.2d at 361, 327 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d
at 477. Moreover, the court quoted Hochfelder v. Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), with seeming approval:
The courts in diminishing the impact of Ultramares have not only embraced the
rule of Glanzer - liability to a foreseen plaintiff - but have extended an ac-
countant's liability for negligence to those who, although not themselves foreseen,
are members of a limited class whose reliance on the financial statements is specif-
ically foreseen.
White, 43 N.Y.2d at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 474. The White court con-
tinued, "here, plaintiff was a member of a limited class whose reliance on the audit and
returns was, or at least should have been, specifically foreseen." Id.
128. The fact that the court could have relied on alternative grounds to reach its
holding in White, does not make the expansive language relied on dicta. Dicta consti-
tutes "[sitatements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand..
." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Wheeler v. Wilken, 58 P.2d 1223,
1226 (Colo. 1936)). Since the tort-like language was the only grounds relied upon, clearly,
it is essential to the case.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/14
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brace the methodology of the Restatement Approach. Both
White and the Restatement refer to the pool of viable plaintiffs
as a limited class of persons foreseen to rely upon an account-
ant's audit work. 2 ' While not expressly repudiating the princi-
ples articulated in Ultramares and Glanzer, the import of the
court's reasoning in White could certainly have been interpreted
as modifying the holdings of those cases sub silentio.13 ° In subse-
quent factual scenarios, the lower courts of New York were sig-
nificantly divided as to whether the contract principles in Ul-
tramares should be retained, or whether the tort principles
implied in White should be adopted.'' The only thing that can
be said with certainty about White is that it created more ques-
tions than it answered." 2
In 1985, the New York Court of Appeals issued another
landmark decision in this area of the law, Credit Alliance Corp.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co.' In Credit Alliance, the plaintiff, a
financial services company, provided financing to L.B. Smith,
129. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
130. Although the language of White refers to viable third-party plaintiffs as those
actually foreseen, the opinion cites Ultramares and Glanzer with approval. White, 43
N.Y.2d at 360-62, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78.
131. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 101 A.D.2d 231, 235,
476 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (1st Dep't 1984), rev'd, 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493
N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985) ("The plaintiffs are members of a limited group to whom defendant
would owe a duty and to whom defendant knew or should have known their audit would
be delivered, and relied upon."); Baer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 934, 436 N.Y.S.2d 693,
696 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 86 A.D.2d 881, 447 N.Y.S.2d
538 (2d Dep't 1982) ("Plaintiff was not a member of a faceless or indeterminate class of
persons ... and is not for that reason precluded from instituting this [negligent misrep-
resentation] action") (citing Gordon v. Holt, 65 A.D.2d 344, 349, 412 N.Y.S.2d 534 (4th
Dep't 1979)); Estate of Douglas, 104 Misc. 2d 430, 433, 428 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560-61 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1980) ("More significantly, the Court of Appeals in White v. Guarente,
[citation omitted] expressly extended the liability of accountants beyond privity, distin-
guishing the case which is generally regarded as the keystone of the pri-,ty requirement,
Ultramares [citation omitted]").
132. One prescient commentator, in discussing the potential of White, envisioned a
factual scenario practically identical to Security Pacific as exposing the accountant to
liability:
For example, the long-term creditors of a corporation often require periodic audits
by an independent accountant as a condition to a loan. In those situations, the
modern accountant should know that the company's audited financial statements
will be relied on by the creditors, that are composed of a definable and limited
class.
Septimus, supra note 29, at 420.
133. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
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Inc. ("Smith") on various occasions. 1 3  The extensions of credit
were preconditioned on the receipt of audited financial state-
ments that were examined by the defendant, Arthur Andersen &
Co. ("Andersen").'35 The financial statements were provided to
the plaintiff by Smith.136
Soon after, Smith filed for bankruptcy, defaulting on several
million dollars of loans.1 7 The plaintiff brought suit against An-
dersen alleging that both statements had materially overstated
Smith's financial well-being. 38 The plaintiff's complaint alleged,
inter alia, negligent misrepresentation on the part of Ander-
sen.'39 The complaint also alleged that Andersen "knew, should
have known or was on notice" that the financial statements were
being used by Smith to induce lenders to extend credit.14 0
In summarily dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the court out-
lined three criteria that it concluded would establish an ade-
quate basis for imposing liability on an accountant to a non-
client for negligent misrepresentation:
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncon-
tractual parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate finan-
cial reports, certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the ac-
countants must have been aware that the financial reports were to
be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the further-
ance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and
(3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the ac-
countants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the
accountants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance.14'
In applying the newly articulated criteria, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege the particular pur-
pose requirement (criterion number one) or the prerequisite
linking conduct (criterion number three) on the part of the ac-
countant. " In assessing the complaint it noted:
134. Id. at 541-42, 483 N.E.2d at 111, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
135. Id. at 541, 483 N.E.2d at 111, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 542, 483 N.E.2d at 112, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
138. Id., 483 N.E.2d at 111-12, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 436-37.
139. Id., 483 N.E.2d at 112, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
142. Id. at 553-54, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444-45.
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[N]o claim is made that Andersen was being employed to prepare
the reports with that particular purpose in mind [to induce the
plaintiffs to extend credit]. Moreover, there is no allegation that
Andersen had any direct dealings with plaintiffs, had specifically
agreed with Smith to prepare the report for plaintiffs' use or ac-
cording to plaintiffs' requirements, or had specifically agreed with
Smith to provide plaintiffs with a copy or actually did so. Indeed,
there is simply no allegation of any word or action on the part of
Andersen directed to plaintiffs, or anything contained in Ander-
sen's retainer agreement with Smith which provided the neces-
sary link between them.1""
In contrast, the court deemed the facts alleged in European
American Bank and Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye,'" the com-
panion case to Credit Alliance, sufficient to establish the requi-
site nexus between the accountant and nonclient." 5 In Euro-
pean American, the plaintiff made a series of loans to Majestic
Electro Industries, Inc. ("Majestic"). 46 Throughout their affilia-
tion, the plaintiff relied on Majestic's interim and year-end fi-
nancial statements, prepared and audited by the defendant, to
determine the amount of money it was willing to lend." 7 Ap-
proximately three years later, when Majestic defaulted on one of
these loans, the plaintiff discovered that Majestic's financial
statements for the prior years had materially overstated the
company's solvency."' 8 Soon thereafter, the plaintiff brought suit
alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation." 9
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had multiple and
"direct oral and written communication[s]" with the plaintiff
during the audit work. 50 Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that
it had discussed Majestic's financial position with the defendant
in face-to-face meetings."5' Furthermore, the plaintiff contended
that the defendant made representations to it concerning the
143. Id.
144. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
145. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 554, 483 N.E.2d at 120, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
146. Id. at 543, 483 N.E.2d at 112-13, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
147. Id., 483 N.E.2d at 113, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
148. Id. at 544, 483 N.E.2d at 113, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
149. Id. at 544-45, 483 N.E.2d at 113, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39.
150. Id. at 544, 483 N.E.2d at 113, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
151. Id.
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value of Majestic's assets.'52 These facts led the court to con-
clude that the defendant "was well aware that a primary, if not
exclusive, end and aim of auditing its client, Majestic Electro,
was to provide [the plaintiff] with the financial information it
required.' ' 53
The more explicit criteria of Credit Alliance provided excel-
lent black letter law, but did not clear up all of the confusion
left by White.154 The court stated that Credit Alliance did "not
represent a departure from the principles articulated in Ul-
tramares, Glanzer and White." 5 ' However, as pointed out previ-
ously, the principles articulated in Ultramares and Glanzer
could be interpreted as inconsistent with those promulgated in
White.156
Thus, the unanswered question in White remained after
Credit Alliance: Is there a tort of negligent misrepresentation in
New York? 157 The continued confusion resulted, in part, from
the juxtaposition of Credit Alliance and European American.
Credit Alliance presented the court with a plaintiff that did not
152. Id. at 545, 483 N.E.2d at 113, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
153. Id. at 554, 483 N.E.2d at 120, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
154. As one commentator has pointed out, "there has been some confusion over how
Ultramares and Credit Alliance should be applied in specific cases." Swanson, supra
note 20, at 23.
155. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d 443.
156. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
157. Following Credit Alliance, the Court of Appeals heard two cases dealing with
claims by nonclients of negligent misrepresentation against accountants. William Iselin
& Co. v. Mann Judd Landau, 71 N.Y.2d 420, 522 N.E.2d 21, 527 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1988);
Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 66 N.Y.2d 16, 484 N.E.2d 1351, 494 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1985). Neither of these cases presented the court with a closer relationship than that
between the nonclient and accountant in Credit Alliance. Such a relationship could have
presented the court with an opportunity to answer this question. See discussion infra
part III.
In Westpac, the complaint did not even allege that the accountants knew their audit
report would be shown to plaintiff, or that the accountants had directed any word or
action toward the plaintiff. Westpac, 66 N.Y.2d at 19, 484 ,N.E.2d at 1353, 494 N.Y.S.2d
at 1353. Thus, the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in Westpac was per-
haps even more tenuous than in Credit Alliance. In Credit Alliance, the plaintiff at least
alleged that the defendant knew that the reports would be shown to it. Credit Alliance,
65 N.Y.2d at 542, 483 N.E.2d at 112, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 437. Similarly, in Mann Judd, the
plaintiff introduced "[n]o evidence in admissible form" that showed the accounting part-
nership's awareness of the plaintiff's reliance. Mann Judd, 71 N.Y.2d at 427, 522 N.E.2d
at 24, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 179. Thus, Mann Judd also presented the same weak relationship
found in Credit Alliance.
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allege any direct contact or communication with the defendant-
accountant. Additionally, in Credit Alliance, the plaintiff failed
to allege any act on the part of Andersen directed toward it. 58
Thus, the relationship between the parties was attenuated.
The strong link between the parties in European American,
on the other hand, presented the court with a plaintiff that was
an intended third-party beneficiary - a viable plaintiff under
the Ultramares standard previously embraced by the court.15
This is evidenced by the extensive communications between the
accountant and the third-party plaintiff, making the facts of Eu-
ropean American on par with those in Glanzer v. Shepard. °60
The three Credit Alliance criteria provided no instruction
for cases in between the extremes of Credit Alliance and Euro-
pean American. However, the criteria could have been read as
adopting a methodology similar to the Restatement Approach.''
The first two Credit Alliance criteria - the particular purpose
and reliance requirements - are consonant with the Restate-
ment formulation.'62 Under the Restatement, the accountant
must be aware that the audit is being conducted to induce the
nonclient's reliance in connection with a particular purpose. 6 3
Additionally, under the Restatement, the third party must rely
on the audit in the furtherance of that particular purpose.'6
The third criterion - the linking conduct require-
ment - presented an additional element not required under
158. See supra text accompanying note 143.
159. See supra notes 79-86. As mentioned previously, the court concluded that the
defendant-accountant in European American, "was well aware that a primary, if not the
exclusive, end and aim of auditing its client, Majestic Electro, was to provide [the plain-
tiff] with the financial information required." Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483
N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444. This relationship makes the plaintiff in European
American an intended third-party beneficiary because the "circumstances indicate[d]
that the promisee [client] intend[ed] to give the beneficiary [plaintiff] the benefit of the
promised performance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b); supra text
accompanying note 82.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72, 144-53.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see supra notes 92-93 and ac-
companying text for further discussion.
162. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 755 (Cal. 1992). In discussing the
Credit Alliance criteria, the California Supreme Court commented that "the first two
elements of the rule (and the New York court's decision in White v. Guarente) are func-
tionally similar to Restatement Second of Torts section 552 .... Id. (citations omitted).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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the Restatement compilation. This requirement of Credit Alli-
ance clearly cut back on some of the expansive language of
White, which seemed to embrace 'an approach identical to that
of the Restatement.165 However, the language the court used in
defining the third criterion seemed to indicate that the Credit
Alliance approach and the Restatement Approach would not
significantly differ. As written, this criterion did not require the
significant linking conduct found in European American, but
only "some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them
to [the third party, and] evinc[ing] the accountants' understand-
ing of that party or parties' reliance.
166
III. SECURITY PACIFIC BUSINESS CREDIT, INC. V. PEAT MARWICK
MAIN & CO.
A. Facts, Procedural History, and Holding
Top Brass Enterprises, Inc. ("Top Brass"), a publicly owned
company engaged in the retailing business, hired accounting
firm, Main Hurdman,16 7 to audit its financial statements and is-
sue an independent audit opinion thereon for fiscal years ended
1983, 1984, and 1985.168 In addition to rendering audit services,
during 1983, Main Hurdman also aided Top Brass in its negotia-
tions for a $20 million line of credit.1 69 One of the several lenders
involved in these negotiations was the plaintiff, Security Pacific
Business Credit, Inc. ("SPBC").1 70 SPBC alleged that it had in-
165. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
166. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443. The
Credit Alliance court itself implied that, except for the linking conduct requirement, the
new criteria it set out would parallel the Restatement Approach:
A greater number [of courts] appear to have adopted a rule requiring that the
reliant party or his limited class be either known or actually foreseen by the ac-
countants. Inasmuch as this .. .rule, deriving from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552, does not include an additional requirement for conduct on the part
of the accountant linking them to the noncontractual party or parties, we decline
to adopt it.
Id. at 553 n.11, 483 N.E.2d at 119 n.11, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444 n.11 (citations omitted).
167. Main Hurdman was succeeded by Peat Marwick & Co. Security Pacific, 79
N.Y.2d 695, 698, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (1992).
168. Id. at 699, 597 N.E.2d at 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
169. Id.
170. Id. According to the court, these negotiations were immaterial to the case "be-
cause the heart of this lawsuit between SPBC and Peat Marwick relate[d] solely to Main
Hurdman's 1984 audit opinion prepared for Top Brass." Id., 597 N.E.2d at 1081-82, 586
[Vol. 13:763
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/14
SECURITY PACIFIC
formed Main Hurdman that it would be relying on its audit re-
ports in considering Top Brass's credit application.1 7 1 Ulti-
mately, however, SPBC's offer for the $20 million line of credit
was not accepted by Top Brass.172
In 1984, Top Brass entered the credit market again, this
time seeking a $50 million line of credit. 173 SPBC made another
proposal to provide this line of credit, which was to be secured
by Top Brass's accounts receivable. 174 Although SPBC con-
ducted its own examination of Top Brass's accounts receivable,
it advised Top Brass that final approval of the line of credit
would be conditioned on Main Hurdman's audit opinion.' 75 Af-
ter its field work, Main Hurdman supplied Top Brass with pre-
liminary financial statements; Top Brass in turn supplied them
to SPBC.' 71
SPBC alleged that upon receiving these financial state-
ments, its vice president telephoned Main Hurdman's audit en-
gagement partner and informed him that SPBC would be rely-
ing on the audit report.' 77 SPBC also contended that, during
this conversation, Main Hurdman made representations con-
N.Y.S.2d at 88-89.
171. Id., 597 N.E.2d at 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
172. Id.
173. Id., 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
174. Id. at 700, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
175. Id. at 699-700, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89. At this time, SPBC did
not contact Main Hurdman to inform them of their intended reliance on their audit
work or seek any of Main Hurdman's work as to the propriety of Top Brass's accounts
receivable. Id. at 700, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
176. Id. Main Hurdman's audit engagement letter (which is essentially the signed
writing between an auditor and his client evidencing the audit contract) did not refer to
SPBC or the line of credit. Id. However, the notes to the preliminary financial state-
ments prepared by Main Hurdman noted that Top Brass was negotiating a new line of
credit. Id. In addition, Main Hurdman's subsequent events memo (which documents an
auditor's work in assessing whether any major events have occurred after its field work,
but prior to the release of the audit opinion, that require disclosure in the financial state-
ments) stated that Top Brass was negotiating for a line of credit with Security Pacific
and/or another lender. Id. The minutes of Top Brass's June 30, 1984 Board of Directors
meeting also discussed the impending negotiations for the line of credit. Id.
177. Id. at 701, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89. SPBC alleged that this call
was made at the suggestion of Top Brass's officers. Id. at 700, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586
N.Y.S.2d at 89. SPBC also alleged in its complaint that this call was made prior to the
date of Main Hurdman's audit opinion, September 12, 1984. Id. Although Main
Hurdman's audit partner did not remember the call, Main Hurdman conceded that it
was made for the purposes of its motion for summary judgment. Id.
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cerning the financial statements, and informed SPBC that the
audit opinion would be a clean one.178 After receiving a copy of
the finalized financial statements and an unqualified audit opin-
ion from Top Brass, SPBC granted the $50 million line of
credit.179
Top Brass's 1985 financial statements, also audited by Main
Hurdman, disclosed that thirty percent of its accounts receiva-
ble were uncollectible, a development which if discovered in the
prior year, would have caused Top Brass to report a significant
net loss. 18° Ultimately, in 1986, Top Brass declared bank-
ruptcy.' 8 1 Shortly thereafter, SPBC sued the defendant, Peat
Marwick, the successor to Main Hurdman, alleging that the 1984
unqualified opinion negligently reported Top Brass's financial
position, and that Main Hurdman was aware of SPBC's reliance
on it. 82
In New York Supreme Court, Peat Marwick moved for and
was granted a dismissal of the complaint.1 83 The First Depart-
ment of the Appellate Division voted 3 to 2 to reverse and de-
nied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but granted
leave to appeal.18 4 The First Department concluded:
Applying the criteria of Credit Alliance, the defendant knew the
purpose of the financial reports and quite possibly that the plain-
tiff was relying on them. To the extent that there are any gaps,
the plaintiff is entitled to further pre-trial discovery before there
can be any consideration of a motion for summary judgment.lss
178. Id. at 701, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89. SPBC's vice president also
alleged that Main Hurdman assured him that the net income figure would not change,
that Top Brass's reserves were adequate, and that Main Hurdman had not discovered
anything that SPBC should be aware of in lending Top Brass money. Id. at 700-01, 597
N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
179. Id. at 701, 597 N.E.2d at 1083, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 702, 597 N.E.2d at 1083, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
183. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., No. 1034/90
(Sup. Ct. New York County Sept. 5, 1990) (Saxe, J.).
184. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 165 A.D.2d
622, 569 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1991), rev'd, 79 N.Y.2d 695, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 596
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1992).
185. Id. at 625, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 59. The dissent agreed with the majority that fur-
ther discovery might disclose that Main Hurdman knew of the particular purpose for
their audit, and that it was aware that SPBC intended to rely on it - the first two
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that SPBC had failed
to allege facts, which if taken as true, would establish that the
criteria set out in Credit Alliance had been met. 186 Thus, the
court concluded that SPBC had "failed to demonstrate the exis-
tence of a relationship between itself and defendant's predeces-
sor accounting firm [was one] 'sufficiently approaching privity'..
S.17 Accordingly, it reversed the First Department's judgment,
and reinstated the Supreme Court's summary judgment
ruling. 88
B. The Reasoning of the Majority
In reinstating the summary judgment in favor of Main
Hurdman, the court determined that the evidence SPBC ad-
duced did not establish that all three elements of Credit Alli-
ance had been met.189 Specifically, the court noted that SPBC
had failed to allege facts that would demonstrate that Main
Hurdman was aware that one of the particular purposes of their
audit was to aid SPBC in securing the line of credit (the first
Credit Alliance criterion), or that there was linking conduct on
the part of Main Hurdman that evinced its understanding of
SPBC's reliance (the third Credit Alliance criterion).1 90
Credit Alliance criteria. Id. at 626-27, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (Carro, J., dissenting). How-
ever, the dissent contended that SPBC had failed to adequately allege the third Credit
Alliance criterion - the linking conduct requirement - because it adduced no evi-
dence that Main Hurdman had any "direct dealings" with SPBC, except for the tele-
phone call. Id. at 627, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61. "[T]here is no evidence of any 'word or
action' on the part of the defendant directed to plaintiff, or anything in defendant's
retainer agreement with Top Brass, which provided the necessary link between them."
Id. at 627, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 61 (quoting Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
65 N.Y.2d 536, 553-54, 483 N.E.2d 110, 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 444-45 (1985) and citing
Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 66 N.Y.2d 16, 19, 484 N.E.2d 1351, 1353, 494
N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (1985)).
186. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 699, 597 N.E.2d at 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
187. Id. (quoting Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d
at 444).
188. Id. at 708, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
189. Id. at 704, 597 N.E.2d at 1085, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 92. See supra text accompany-
ing note 141.
190. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 705-07, 597 N.E.2d at 1085-86, 586 N.Y.S.2d at
92-93. The court commented:
[T]he record indicates that the primary, if not exclusive, end and aim of the Main
Hurdman audit was for use in Top Brass's audit report as required by Federal law
for a publicly held company. While Main Hurdman knew the identity of the spe-
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In concluding that SPBC had failed to allege facts that
would establish that the first Credit Alliance criterion had been
met, the court commented that:
[T]here is no evidence that Main Hurdman shaped its 1984 audit
opinion to meet any needs of SPBC. Neither is there any claim or
proof that Main Hurdman directly supplied SPBC with a copy of
the audit report or opinion or ever agreed to do so .... Similarly,
the audit engagement letter between Top Brass and Main
Hurdman does not mention SPBC or provide or suggest the nec-
essary link to SPBC. To be sure also, there is no claim that Main
Hurdman was aware that "a primary, if not the exclusive, end
and aim of auditing its client... [Top Brass] was to provide...
[SPBC] with the financial information it required."1 91
The court also added that SPBC tendered no evidence that
Main Hurdman was hired to prepare its audit opinion "for the
purpose of inducing SPBC to extend credit to Top Brass," or
that Main Hurdman ever specifically agreed to prepare its audit
opinion "for SPBC's use or according to SPBC's require-
ments." '192 As to SPBC's failure with regard to the third crite-
rion, the court reasoned that if a lender could satisfy the linking
conduct requirement by simply telephoning its debtor's auditor,
the lender would be receiving an insurance policy on its loan for
the bargain price of a telephone call. 193 The court concluded that
"[tihis plainly is not what Credit Alliance and its related prece-
dents effected."' 9' The court also deemed SPBC's evidence con-
cific party, SPBC, the complaint and supporting documents fail to allege or
demonstrate Main Hurdman's awareness of any other "particular purpose" for
their services, or conduct on the part of Main Hurdman creating an "unmistaka-
ble relationship" with SPBC.
Id. at 707, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
191. Id. at 706-07, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d 536, 554, 483 N.E.2d 110, 120,
493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 445 (1985)).
192. Id. at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
193. Id. The court opined that Main Hurdman's audit engagement partner's re-
sponses to SPBC's questions about the propriety of Top Brass's financial statements
during the telephone call were limited to "generalities," and did not satisfy the linking
conduct requirement of the Credit Alliance test. Id. at 705, 597 N.E.2d at 1085, 586
N.Y.S.2d at 92.
194. Id. at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1085, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 92. Earlier in its opinion, the
court contrasted SPBC's relationship with Main Hurdman with that between the plain-
tiff and defendant in European American: "There [in European American], the ac-
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cerning Main Hurdman's negotiations with it in 1983 for the $20
million line of credit insignificant in determining whether Peat
Marwick could be held liable for Main Hurdman's 1984 audit. 195
In closing, the court characterized Main Hurdman's audit
work as being a "convenient instrumentality" for use in the de-
velopment of Top Brass's business. 9 6 The financial statements
based on this work, it concluded, were only "incidentally" or
"collaterally" for the use of those to whom Top Brass might ex-
hibit them. 97
C. The Lone Dissenter
The dissenting opinion by Judge Hancock contended that,
for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment, SPBC had
made a sufficient showing that all of the Credit Alliance criteria
were met."9 8 Judge Hancock began his dissent by accusing the
court of announcing a new rule to govern accountants' liability
for negligent misrepresentation.199 He first argued that only the
third of the Credit Alliance criteria - the linking conduct re-
quirement - was really at issue, and that in the final analysis,
all of the criteria had been met.2 00 Significant to his reasoning
was the fact that the court was reviewing a motion for summary
judgment.20 1 Accordingly, SPBC did not have to "prove the
'linking conduct,' only demonstrate a triable issue of fact.
20 2
Judge Hancock argued that the first and second Credit Alli-
ance criteria - the particular purpose and reliance require-
countants had multiple, direct and substantive communications and personal meetings
with the relying lender during the entire course of the lending relationship. Here,
SPBC's claimed relationship to Main Hurdman, 'sufficiently approaching privity', rises
or falls essentially on the single unsolicited phone call." Id. at 705, 597 N.E.2d at 1085,
586 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
195. Id. at 707, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93-94.
196. Id. at 708, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
197. Id. (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 183, 174 N.E. 441, 446
(1931) and citing Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922)).
198. Id. at 714-17, 597 N.E.2d at 1090-93, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 97-100 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
199. Id. at 708, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
200. Id. at 709, 597 N.E.2d at 1088, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404,
144 N.E.2d 387, 392, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 504 (1957)).
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ments-were undisputed. 20 3  The telephone conversation be-
tween the engagement partner of Main Hurdman and SPBC's
vice president established that Main Hurdman knew, "that the
audit was to be used for the credit negotiations and that SPBC
would rely on its audit report." 0'
Judge Hancock chided the majority for suggesting that New
York law clearly showed that the contact between Main
Hurdman and SPBC was not sufficient to satisfy the linking
conduct requirement of Credit Alliance.' 5 No New York deci-
sion, Judge Hancock pointed out, had ever articulated what con-
duct was sufficient to satisfy this criterion.20 Judge Hancock
further commented that:
The language of the Credit Alliance opinion suggests that what is
called for is an evidentiary showing of some communication or
contacts demonstrating the accountant's awareness of the third
party's reliance. Indeed, this is how other courts have read Credit
Alliance. As one court put it, the requirement is "that the ac-
countants manifest conduct underscoring their understanding of
a particular nonclient's reliance upon their work product."20 7
According to Judge Hancock, several of the facts alleged
represented the requisite 'linking conduct': the telephone con-
versation between SPBC's vice president and Main Hurdman's
audit engagement partner; Main Hurdman's final engagement
memo referencing the plaintiff as a potential lender; and the
prior negotiations in which Main Hurdman was involved.08
In the second half of his dissent, Judge Hancock defined the
203. Id.
204. Id. at 714, 597 N.E.2d at 1091, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
205. Id. at 715, 597 N.E.2d at 1091-92, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 98-99.
206. Id., 597 N.E.2d at 1091, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
207. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d
1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1990)).
208. Id. at 715, 597 N.E.2d at 1092, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 99. Judge Hancock also quoted
Huang v. Sentinel Govt. Sec., 709 F. Supp. 1290, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), which stated that
the test for whether the third criterion was met "is not.., formal direct communication,
but rather some link of the 'defendant to plaintiff which evinces defendant's understand-
ing of plaintiff's reliance.'" Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 715, 597 N.E.2d at 1091, 586
N.Y.S.2d at 98. Judge Hancock added that "[i]f, as the language of Credit Alliance indi-
cates, what is required is a demonstration of some conduct evincing or underscoring the
accountant's knowledge of the reliance, then it seems self-evident that there is enough to
withstand summary judgment here." Id., 597 N.E.2d at 1092, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
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new rule that he contended the majority adopted for measuring
accountants' liability for negligent misrepresentation. °9 This
rule, he argued, was a regression to the stringent privity require-
ments established by Ultramares and Glanzer.1 0 Two aspects of
the majority opinion convinced him that this was so. First, the
majority's insistence that the inducement of SPBC's reliance on
the financial statements was not the exclusive "end and aim" of
Main Hurdman's audit.2 ' Second, the majority's requirement
that Main Hurdman's linking conduct establish an "unmistaka-
ble relationship" with SPBC.2
12
Commenting on the first aspect of the majority's opinion,
Judge Hancock noted that in Ultramares and Glanzer, "[f]or all
intents and purposes, plaintiff's relationship must have been
that of a third-party beneficiary to the contract for the account-
ants' services. "213 He further asserted that the court's holding in
White v. Guarente reduced the rigors of Ultramares to require
that the inducement of the plaintiff's reliance only be "one of
the ends and aims" that is specifically foreseen by the
accountant.2 " '
Under this reasoning, by requiring that SPBC's reliance be
"the end and aim" of Main Hurdman's audit, the majority re-
erected the privity restrictions of Ultramares.16 As to the sec-
ond aspect, Judge Hancock maintained that the examples pro-
vided by the court of the conduct that would demonstrate an
"unmistakable relationship," established that something more
than conduct evincing the accountant's understanding of the
plaintiff's reliance would be the new standard. 6
Judge Hancock concluded his dissent by arguing that the
record showed that the first two Credit Alliance criteria had
209. Id. at 717-19, 597 N.E.2d at 1092-93, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01.
210. Id. The majority retorted that the law of New York had never deviated from
Ultramares and contended that its opinion in this case was consonant with the principle
established in Ultramares and followed by its progeny. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at
707-08, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
211. Id. at 708, 717, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 1093, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94, 100 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 718, 597 N.E.2d at 1093, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
214. Id. at 719, 597 N.E.2d at 1094, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (emphasis removed).
215. Id. (emphasis added in quotation).
216. Id. at 718-19, 597 N.E.2d at 1093-94, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01.
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been met.21" He further argued that the evidence adduced by
SPBC also raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the third
criterion had been met.2 18
IV. Analysis
A. Security Pacific: All Doubts Resolved - There is No Tort
of Negligent Misrepresentation in New York
The question raised by White v. Guarente29 and left open
by Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 220 is an-
swered in Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co.:221 There is no tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation in New York.
Security Pacific is more than just a dispute between the
majority and the dissent about the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to survive a motion for summary judgment. The two opin-
ions used different standards in approaching the negligent mis-
representation cause of action. The majority interpreted Credit
Alliance as calling for an application of the contract principles
of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.222 The dissent, on the other
hand, interpreted Credit Alliance as requiring a methodology
similar to that of the Restatement Approach.2 2
The majority's application of the first and third Credit Alli-
ance criteria demonstrate its strict use of the principles of Ul-
tramares. In dismissing SPBC's evidence with regard to the first
criterion - the particular purpose requirement - the court
concluded that SPBC had failed to allege that: "Main Hurdman
shaped its 1984 audit opinion to meet any needs of SPBC ;224 or
that Main Hurdman "directly supplied SPBC with a copy of the
217. Id. at 720, 597 N.E.2d at 1094, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
218. Id.
219. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977); see supra notes 120-
32 and accompanying text.
220. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985); see supra notes 133-
53 and accompanying text.
221. 79 N.Y.2d 695, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 586 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1992).
222. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
224. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93; see
supra text accompanying note 191.
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audit report or opinion";22 5 or that Main Hurdman ever specifi-
cally agreed to prepare its audit opinion "for SPBC's use or ac-
cording to SPBC's requirements." ' 6 However, if SPBC adduced
evidence such as this, it would have alleged facts that would
make it an intended third-party beneficiary to the audit contract
between Top Brass and Main Hurdman.227
All of these scenarios, independently or taken together, be-
speak a relationship that would satisfy section 302 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts.2 2 8  In each, "the circumstances
[would] indicate that the promisee [client] intend[ed] to give the
beneficiary [third party] the benefit of the promised perform-
ance." 229 In situations where an accountant shapes the audit for
a third-party plaintiff's purposes, directly supplies that plaintiff
with the audit report, or tailors the audit opinion to meet that
plaintiff's needs, the plaintiff's reliance is the primary or sole
225. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93; see
supra text accompanying note 191.
226. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93; see
supra text accompanying note 191. The court derived all of these scenarios directly from
Credit Alliance. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553-54, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d
at 444-45; see supra text accompanying note 191. The facts of each purportedly bear
indicia that demonstrate the particular purpose requirement has been met (at least for
the purposes of a motion for summary judgment). However, in enumerating these scena-
rios, the Security Pacific court significantly omitted one scenario proffered by the Credit
Alliance court, which under a consistent analysis, should equally show that the particu-
lar purpose requirement has been met. The Credit Alliance court stated:
Moreover, there is no allegation that Andersen [the accountant] had any direct
dealings with plaintiffs, had specifically agreed with Smith [the client] to prepare
the report for the plaintiffs' use or according to plaintiffs' requirements, or had
specifically agreed with Smith to provide plaintiffs with a copy or actually did so.
Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444 (emphasis
added). Thus, it seems that the Credit Alliance court envisaged that the direct dealings
between the accountant and nonclient in Security Pacific could be sufficient to satisfy
the particular purpose requirement.
227. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979); see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
1 229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979); see supra text accompany-
ing note 82. As in Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 237-38, 120 N.E. 639, 641 (1918),
which held in favor of an intended beneficiary of a will who was not named in the will
reasoning that a third party can sue for breach of a contract made for his direct benefit,
see supra note 84, in each of these scenarios the audit contract would be made for the
direct benefit of the nonclient, and under third-party beneficiary contract principles, the
nonclient would be permitted to sue for a breach of it. Id.
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"end and aim" of the audit under Glanzer v. Shepard."3 °
The court admonished that these situations were presented
as "nonexclusive types of activity," which would establish that
the Credit Alliance criteria had been met.23 This caution, how-
ever, in no way offers a more expansive reading of the opinion.
While these scenarios may not be the only way to satisfy Credit
Alliance, the clear import of the court's reasoning is that the
connection between the third party and the accountant must be
as extensive as in all of these situations.
The court's reading of the third Credit Alliance criterion -
the linking conduct requirement - further displays its strict
use of the principles of Ultramares. The court concluded that
SPBC's allegations as to Main Hurdman's conduct did not
demonstrate an "unmistakable relationship" between the two
parties.232  It eschewed SPBC's evidence regarding Main
Hurdman's prior negotiations with it, as well as Main
Hurdman's representations to SPBC during the telephone
call.23 3
230. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); see supra notes 67-78 and accompanying
text. Thus, as in Glanzer where the seller was the formal promisee but the contract was
for the benefit of the buyer, see supra text accompanying note 76, under Security Pacific
even though the audit client is the formal promisee, the contract must be for the specific
benefit of the nonclient in order for the nonclient to be a viable plaintiff.
231. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 707, 597 N.E.2d at 1086-87, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93-
94.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text. None of the cases that the
Court of Appeals heard following Credit Alliance refined the precise requirements of the
linking conduct element of the test. See, e.g., William Iselin & Co., Inc. v. Landau, 71
N.Y.2d 420, 522 N.E.2d 21, 527 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1988); Westpac Banking Corp. v. Des-
champs, 66 N.Y.2d 16, 484 N.E.2d 1351, 494 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1985); see supra note 157.
However, the conduct of Main Hurdman in Security Pacific satisfies the plain language
the Court of Appeals used in Credit Alliance. The third criterion calls for "some conduct
on the part of the accountants linking them to [the nonclient], which evinces the ac-
countants' understanding of [the nonclient's] reliance." Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at
551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (emphasis added); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 141-43 and accompanying text. Main Hurdman's previous negotiations with
SPBC, a major potential lender of the client, in which Main Hurdman gained an under-
standing that the lender would condition its loan on the receipt of audited financial
statements, see supra text accompanying notes 169-79, as well as Main Hurdman's rep-
resentations directly to SPBC over the telephone concerning Top Brass's financial state-
ments, see supra text accompanying note 178, surely qualifies as "some conduct" linking
Main Hurdman with SPBC, evincing Main Hurdman's understanding of SPBC's
reliance.
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/14
SECURITY PACIFIC
By contrast, the court put its imprimatur on the factual sce-
nario in European Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye,234
where the contact between the accountant and nonclient was
"multiple, direct and substantive.""2 ' By quantifying the com-
munications and contacts that the third party must have with
the accountant, the court construed the third Credit Alliance
criterion as calling for conduct that would establish the audit
"was primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if
not in name, a party to the contract, and only incidentally for
that of the formal promisee."2 8 When an accountant has multi-
ple, direct, and substantive communications and contacts with a
third party, it is clear that the client has intended the benefit of
the audit to inure to the third party and that the third party's
reliance is the primary or sole "end and aim" of the audit.137
In sum, the practical significance of Security Pacific is that
in New York, in order for a nonclient to successfully assert negli-
gent misrepresentation against an accountant, it must show that
it is a third-party beneficiary to the audit contract.23 Under Se-
curity Pacific, the bounds of the negligent misrepresentation
cause of action are coterminous with those of contract law.
If the dissent had commanded a majority vote in Security
Pacific, the tort of negligent misrepresentation would have been
born. In arguing that the first and second criteria - the partic-
ular purpose and reliance requirements - were met, Judge
234. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985); see supra notes 144-
53 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 194.
236. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 83, 174 N.E. at 446; see supra note 75.
237. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); see supra notes 67-78 and accom-
panying text. In one sense the court's analysis in Security Pacific could be interpreted as
even more restrictive than that in Glanzer. In Glanzer, Judge Cardozo wrote:
Constantly the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of prospective use. We
must view the act [of the negligent misrepresentation] in its setting, which will
include the implications and the promptings of usage and fair dealing. The casual
response, made in mere friendliness or courtesy may not stand on the same plane.
• . as the deliberate certificate ... intended to sway conduct.
Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276. The setting in which Main Hurdman and SPBC dealt shows
that Main Hurdman's representations were a far cry from "casual." Indeed, the prior
negotiations in which Main Hurdman participated, and Main Hurdman's responses con-
cerning Top Brass's financial statements during a telephone call were more akin to the
deliberate certificate in Glanzer, which was "intended to sway conduct."
238. See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
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Hancock commented that Main Hurdman knew "that the audit
was to be used for the credit negotiations and that SPBC would
rely on its audit report."2 9 Under this standard, it would seem
that if the accountant was aware that one of the reasons why the
audit was being conducted was to induce the plaintiff's reliance
for a particular purpose (such as a loan), and if the plaintiff so
relied, the first two Credit Alliance criteria would be met.""
This construction of Credit Alliance would have made the law of
New York parallel to section 552 of the Second Restatement of
Torts.2 1 The Restatement Approach, as mentioned previously,
expands an accountant's liability to any nonclient or limited
group of nonclients actually foreseen to be relying on the au-
dited financial statements.242
Under Judge Hancock's analysis, the criteria of Credit Alli-
ance would only diverge from the Restatement Approach with
regard to the third Credit Alliance criterion - the requirement
of linking conduct.24 3 However, his interpretation of this require-
ment makes this divergence minimal. According to Judge Han-
cock, the linking conduct requirement is satisfied by "an eviden-
tiary showing of some communication or contacts demonstrating
the accountant's awareness of the third party's reliance."2"
239. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 714, 597 N.E.2d at 1091, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 98
(Hancock, J., dissenting).
240. Judge Hancock's standard would be more expansive than the court's. Judge
Hancock would not require that the audit's "end and aim" be for the nonclient's benefit,
Cf. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275, but would allow certain incidental
beneficiaries to recover. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14. As in Strauss v.
Belle Realty Co., 98 A.D.2d 424, 469 N.Y.S.2d 948 (2d Dep't 1983), see supra note 85,
nonclients that the accountant is aware will rely on the audit "derive benefit from the
performance of [the audit contract] though [the nonclient] is neither the promisee nor
the one whom performance is to be rendered . Id. at 426-27, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 950
(citations omitted).
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see supra notes 92-93 and ac-
companying text.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see supra notes 92-93 and ac-
companying text.
243. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
244. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 715, 597 N.E.2d at 1091, 586 N.Y.S at 98 (Han-
cock, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 207. Judge Hancock's interpreta-
tion of the linking conduct element finds strong support in the plain language of Credit
Alliance, which requires only "some conduct on the part of the accountants linking
them" to the nonclient. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
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Thus, under this standard, any act directed toward the non-
client, tending to show the accountant's understanding of the
nonclient's reliance, would satisfy the third prong of the test.
Admittedly, this requirement creates a slightly higher standard
than the Restatement Approach, because under the latter meth-
odology the accountant can be held liable without directing any
conduct toward the nonclient.24 5 However, Judge Hancock's ap-
proach would still constitute a tort theory.
Any act by an accountant directed toward a nonclient,
would not "indicate the assumption of a duty to make repara-
tion if the benefit [a 'non-negligent' audit] is lost,""" and would
certainly not confer intended third-party beneficiary status on
the nonclient. 4 7 Accordingly, Judge Hancock's interpretation of
Credit Alliance would have created an "obligation that [is] im-
posed by law - apart from and independent of promises made
and therefore apart from the manifested intention of the parties.
"I48 An obligation of this nature is classified as a tort
obligation.24 9
B. The Contract Principles Utilized in Security Pacific Ignore
the Contemporary Role of the Audit in the Business
Community.
When an accountant undertakes the auditing function, he is
well aware why he is being retained - some third party has re-
quired that the accountant's client obtain independent verifica-
tion of its financial statements. 251 It is very rare indeed that an
245. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
246. Airco Alloys Div., Airco Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 76 A.D.2d 68, 79,
430 N.Y.S.2d 179, 185 (4th Dep't 1980); see supra note 85.
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1979); see supra notes 81-85
and accompanying text. As in Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 98 A.D.2d 424, 469 N.Y.S.2d
948 (1983); see supra note 85, the nonclient in this scenario would be an incidental bene-
ficiary to the audit contract because the nonclient would "derive benefit from the per-
formance of a contract though [it] is neither the promisee nor the one whom perform-
ance is to be rendered .... " Strauss, 98 A.D.2d at 426-27, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (citations
omitted). Additionally, a minor act by the accountant directed to the nonclient would
not "show that [the accountant] intended to allow [the nonclient] to recover for the
damages resulting from [the breach of contract]." Id. at 426-427, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
248. KEETON, supra note 9, § 92 at 655; see supra note 64 for further discussion.
249. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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audit is conducted primarily for benefit of management.2 15 ' After
all, in a vast majority of businesses, management is comprised of
business experts, who are intricately involved with their com-
pany's operations on a daily basis, year-round.2 52 Plainly, man-
agement would not need to hire independent auditors, who only
conduct their field work for one or two months, to learn about
their business.2 53
The accounting profession, 54 several commentators,255 as
well as several courts, 256 recognize that the contemporary role of
the audit is to benefit third parties such as investors, lenders,
and shareholders. 57 Although these parties are often not third-
party beneficiaries to the audit contract, their reliance on the
audited financial statements is justified and reasonable. Indeed,
such reliance is integral to uninhibited commercial inter-
course. 5 s The contract principles utilized in Security Pacific
wrongly foreclose these parties from relief. 259 By restricting the
scope of the negligent misrepresentation cause of action to the
domain of contract law, the court has undermined the justified
reliance of these third parties, and at least to some extent, may
have stagnated the free flow of commerce.
In assessing Main Hurdman's audit of Top Brass, the Court
of Appeals characterized Main Hurdman's audit work as merely
a "convenient instrumentality" 260 for use in Top Brass's busi-
251. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
252. The goal of the audit is no longer to assess management's stewardship of the
business. See supra notes 32-35. As the accounting profession recognizes, the contempo-
rary role of the audit is to provide "investors, bankers, creditors, and others with reason-
able assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement." AICPA,
supra note 38, at 36.
253. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. An audit is only intended to
provide reasonable assurance that a client's financial statements are presented fairly. See
supra text accompanying notes 51-53. Accordingly, in most audits, the accountant only
reviews a sample of transactions that have occurred over the audit period. See supra text
accompanying note 52. It is for this reason that management is often more familiar with
the intricacies of the enterprise's daily operations.
254. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
260. Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 707, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
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ness, and only "incidentally" '61 or "collaterally '262 for the use of
third parties.2"3 A closer analysis of the contemporary role of the
audit exposes this characterization as patently erroneous. One of
the primary reasons why Main Hurdman was retained to audit
Top Brass's financial statements was to offer third parties such
as SPBC reasonable assurance that Top Brass's financial state-
ments were not materially misstated.
C. The New York Legislature Should Take Action.
The predominance of policy questions26 involved in this in-
tractable area of the law makes the courts an ill-equipped body
to provide an equitable resolution of the proper scope of ac-
countants' liability for negligent misrepresentation.2 5 In New
York's tripartite governmental framework, the legislature was
intended to be the premiere policy-making body, not the judici-
ary.266 Only the legislature has the ability to conduct detailed
studies, hold hearings, and fully hear arguments from all parties
effected.26 7
Security Pacific is paradigmatic of a court's failure in this
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
265. The Court of Appeals itself has contemplated legislative action in this area of
the law. As far back as Ultramares, in discussing whether the duty to third parties for
negligent misrepresentation should be commensurate with that of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that "[a] change so revolutionary, if expedient,
must be wrought by legislation." Ultramares, 255 N.Y at 187, 174 N.E. at 447.
In Security Pacific, the majority, in criticizing the dissent, stated that, "[w]e have
declined to adopt the broad-brush transformation of the liability formula espoused by
the dissenting opinion, because such an extension of liability formula to noncontracting
parties is 'unwise as a matter of policy ... or, at the least, a matter for legislative rather
than judicial reform.'" Security Pacific, 79 N.Y.2d at 708, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 586
N.Y.S.2d at 94 (quoting Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson,
73 N.Y.2d 417, 425, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1989) and citing Credit
Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d 536, 553 n.11, 483 N.E.2d 110, 119 n.11, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 444 n.11
(1985)).
266. See N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (vesting legislative power in the legislature). For a
discussion of the limits of judicial policy making in New York, see 20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Con-
stitutional Law § 161 (1982) and cases cited therein.
267. See N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (vesting legislative power in the legislature); In re
Joint Legislative Committee, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769 (1941) (legislative power autho-
rizes investigations into matters of public welfare).
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regard. The three juridical approaches that were available to the
Court of Appeals all offer a flawed outcome. The Foreseeability
Approach, by creating liability to all parties who are reasonably
foreseeable to rely on an accountant's work, certainly runs the
risk of imposing inordinate liability on accountants. 25 As the
current statistics show, Chief Judge Cardozo's statements con-
cerning "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class '"269 were prophetic. There
are unique attributes about the profession of accounting, which
make it particularly susceptible to excessive liability.2 70 As men-
tioned previously, a great number of third parties rely on the
audited financial statements in making crucial business deci-
sions.2 71 Accordingly, when the audited financial statements are
materially misstated, painting a rosier picture than reality, a
large number of third parties can be adversely affected. A "na-
ked" foreseeability analysis exposes accountants to suits from
these third parties, whether or not the audit was conducted
negligently. 27 1
The Restatement Approach, on the other hand, offers the
fortuitous result of making only those third parties who are ac-
tually foreseen competent plaintiffs . 7 The facts of Security Pa-
cific are illustrative. Under the Restatement Approach, by sim-
ply making itself known to the defendant, Main Hurdman, the
plaintiff, SPBC, could have transformed itself into a viable
plaintiff.2 74 In addition, although more expansive than the Priv-
ity Approach,7 5 the Restatement methodology is still inconsis-
tent with the contemporary role of the audit.7 6 A variety of
third parties, not actually foreseen but reasonably foreseeable,
268. See supra text accompanying note 94.
269. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
271. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 94. The mere fact that financial statements are materially mis-
stated does not necessarily mean that an accountant has been negligent. The purpose of
most audits is to provide reasonable assurance that the financial statement are free from
material misstatement. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53. Thus, it is possible
that an audit could be conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted Audit Stan-
dards, but the financial statements would still be materially misstated.
273. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 32-35, 92-93 and accompanying text.
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may legitimately rely on audited financial statements in making
crucial business decisions. 7 Indeed, in many cases the reason
the audit is conducted is not for any one specifically foreseen
party or parties, but for reasonably foreseeable third parties.7 8
Despite the two unsatisfactory approaches available, the
Court of Appeals chose an even more inequitable stan-
dard - the Privity Approach. 7 9 By utilizing this approach and
circumscribing the scope of liability in negligent misrepresenta-
tion to the domain of contract law,280 the court has foreclosed
relief to many more third parties who legitimately rely on ac-
countants' work.281
The New York Legislature has the ability to craft tort lia-
bility in such a fashion as to avoid the inadequacies of the three
judicial options available. Four state legislatures, Arkansas, 282 Il-
linois, 283 Kansas 84 and Utah, 8 5 have enacted legislation to gov-
ern accountants' liability to nonclients for negligent misrepre-
sentation; however, these measures are, in essence, codifications
of the Privity Approach.288 This Note proposes an altogether dif-
ferent approach.
The legislature should act to craft a tort of negligent mis-
representation. Tort liability in this area of the law is a neces-
sity. If it is reasonably foreseeable that a third party would re-
ceive a copy of a client's financial statements and rely on the
accountant's audit work, the accountant should be held liable to
the third party for injury caused by the accountant's negli-
gence.2 8 Inevitably, these third parties are the reason the audit
was conducted in the first place.2 88 This standard comports with
the contemporary function of the audit, and offers recompense
277. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 54-86 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
282. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie Supp. 1989); see supra note 88.
283. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 225, § 450/30.1 (Michie 1993); see supra note 88.
284. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (Supp. 1989); see supra note 88.
285. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (1990); see supra note 88.
286. See Joey D. Duke, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Mis-
representation: Should There be a Uniform Standard, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 133, 139
(1990).
287. See supra text accompanying note 94.
288. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
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to those who legitimately rely on accountants' work, but who
cannot establish that they are third-party beneficiaries.289
However, as the current liability statistics show,290 this pro-
posal will assuredly expose accountants to inordinate liability
unless the legislature also adopts substantive and procedural
"brakes" to protect accountants.291 As the accounting profession
itself points out, the primary factor causing exposure to exorbi-
tant liability is joint and several liability.2 9 2 The New York Leg-
islature should eliminate this system as it applies to
accountants.
In the accountant-third party scenario, joint and several lia-
bility works as a device for injustice. The unique status of ac-
countants in third-party suits alleging negligent misrepresenta-
tion bolsters the argument for the elimination of joint and
several liability in this context.2 '9 3 Inevitably, the primary reason
289. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
291. Although the focus of the argument in this section concerns the abrogation of
joint and several liability, other safeguards can also facilitate the protection of account-
ants from excessive liability and should be investigated. For instance, shareholders' de-
rivative suits present an analogous context to the one at hand. Both there and here,
there is a grave risk that the plaintiff will use the judicial process to extort a settlement
out of a "deep pocket" defendant. See THE LIABILITY CRIsIs, supra note 6, at 20. The
legislature has remedied this risk in shareholder derivative suits by requiring plaintiffs to
post a bond and pay attorneys fees if the suit is unsuccessful. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627
(McKinney 1961). Similarly, in the accountant-third party context, plaintiffs asserting
suits of negligent misrepresentation could be required to post bond, and to pay attorneys'
fees if they lose.
292. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
293. In the accountant-third party context, particularly in New York, the policy rea-
sons that would justify the maintenance of joint and several liability are wholly inappli-
cable. The first policy reason proffered in support of joint and several liability is that of
compensation. See supra note 9. The joint tortfeasor, who has collaborated in causing an
injury, should bear the risk of a co-defendant's insolvency, not the innocent victim. See
supra note 9. However, under Security Pacific, the various third parties who rely on the
audit, but who would only be classified as incidental third-party beneficiaries to the au-
dit contract, are completely denied recovery. See supra notes 222-238 and accompanying
text. By expanding accountants' liability to those third parties who are reasonably fore-
seeable but simultaneously limiting these parties' recovery to the percentage of damages
that the accountant caused, this proposal facilitates, rather than frustrates, the compen-
sation objective.
The second policy reason justifying joint and several liability - that the prospect
of total liability will greater deter the would-be joint tortfeasor's negligent conduct - is
equally inapplicable in the accountant-third party scenario in New York. Supra note 9.
Here again, under Security Pacific, accountants can not be held liable to nonclients who
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/14
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that an accountant is sued, or joined to the third party's claim,
is because the client is unable to satisfy the judgment, often
times due to insolvency. 94 Unlike other contexts, where a joint
tortfeasor may not be able to obtain contribution from a joint
tortfeasor, in this context, it is essentially guaranteed that the
accountant will not be able to obtain contribution. 95
In the overwhelming majority of audits, an accountant relies
upon management's competence and integrity. 96 The prepara-
tion of fairly stated financial statements is management's re-
sponsibility. 297 Thus, if there has been a material misstatement
in the financial statements, a portion of the fault is necessarily
allocable to the company's negligence or lack of integrity. Of
course, the company's demise, the impetus for the third-party
suit, will preclude the accountant from obtaining contribution
for this portion of the damages caused. Consequently, in claims
by nonclients against accountants, joint and several liability is
inequitable because it essentially guarantees that accountants
will pay a greater proportion of the damages than they have
caused.
VII. Conclusion
Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick
Main & Co.'s dictate is manifest - There is no tort of negligent
misrepresentation in New York. The New York Court of Ap-
peals has restricted the boundaries of the negligent misrepresen-
tation cause of action to that of third-party beneficiary princi-
are only incidental third-party beneficiaries to the audit contract. See supra notes 186-93
and accompanying text. Thus, with regard to these plaintiffs, under current New York
law, there is no incentive for the accountant to refrain from engaging in negligent con-
duct. By giving these plaintiffs standing to sue, but limiting their judgments to the pro-
portion of damages that the accountant has caused, the New York Legislature would
enhance the deterrence factor, not undermine it.'
294. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. The proposal of a different liabil-
ity system for accountants is consistent with Chief Judge Cardozo's initial explanation of
the unique attributes of the accounting profession, which would expose an accountant to
"liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931); see
supra text accompanying note 66.
296. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 51-53.
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pies under contract law. These contract principles are
incompatible with the role of the audit in the modern business
community. The New York Court of Appeals' holding in Secur-
ity Pacific denies third parties who legitimately and detrimen-
tally rely on accountants' negligent audit work the relief they
deserve.
Incidents such as the S&L debacle, have left the public
questioning the role of accountants in the modern financial com-
munity. Security Pacific can do nothing else but exacerbate this
uncertainty. In essence, the case is another reminder to third
parties, such as creditors, investors and shareholders, that al-
though the audited financial statements they rely on to make
important business decisions may be negligently misstated, they
are without protection of the law.
Security Pacific is a clear signal that the legislature of New
York should act. The New York legislature has the resources to
offer these third parties recompense, but only where recompense
is due. By expanding liability for negligent misrepresentation to
all reasonably foreseeable third parties, while simultaneously ex-
cising joint and several liability, the legislature could provide an
equitable result for both the accountants and third parties in-
volved. It is time for New York to take the lead in this area of
the law again. This time, however, through the legislature.
Richard D. Holahan, Jr.
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